

THE EXTERNAL CONFLICT OF MODERN WAR CORRESPONDENTS:
TECHNOLOGY'S INEVITABLE IMPACT ON THE EXTINCTION
OF NOSTALGIC COMBAT REPORTING

James Colby Horton, B.A.

Thesis Prepared for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS

August 2002

APPROVED:

Jacqueline Lambiase, Major Professor
James Mueller, Committee Member
Richard Wells, Committee Member
Mitchell Land, Director of the Frank W.
Mayborn Institute of Journalism
Jim Albright, Chair of the Department of
Journalism
C. Neal Tate, Dean of the Robert B. Toulouse
School of Graduate Studies

Horton, James Colby. The External Conflict of Modern War Correspondents:
Technology's Inevitable Impact on the Extinction of Nostalgic Combat Reporting.

Master of Arts (Journalism), August 2002, 136 pp., 10 tables, reference list, 111 titles.

Through historical and content analyses of war coverage, this study qualitatively addresses emotional quality, use of sources, and implied use of technology to better understand the tension between Vietnam and Afghanistan war correspondents and their military counterparts. Early American democracy aspired to give total freedom to its people. But the American military, in its quest to uphold the ideas of democracy, has often challenged the freedom of press clause set forth by the United States Constitution. Since the Vietnam era, the relationship between the military and the media has been plagued by questions of censorship, assertions of falsehood, and threats to national security. But it is the technological advancements in both reporting and combat techniques that have caused a disappearance of the nostalgic war coverage that American correspondents once prospered from. The possibility of returning to journalists' vision of unrestricted press access is all but lost due to such advancements.

Copyright 2002

by

James Colby Horton

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I believe the question of First Amendment suppression should be an essential and integral aspect of journalism scholarship. I wish to extend my sincere appreciation and thanks to Dr. Jacqueline Lambiase, committee chairperson, as well as Dr. James Mueller and Dr. Richard Wells, members of my thesis committee, for letting me partake in the exploration of this question. I would also like to thank them for their patience, comments, and suggestions.

Thanks also to my family and friends for their support of my efforts and for never letting me give up. But I would especially like to thank my wife, Cheryl, whose extreme patience, support, and understanding throughout the whole process truly kept me motivated.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iii
LIST OF TABLES	v
 Chapter	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. THE EVOLUTION OF CONFLICT: REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD TO KOREA	13
3. THE VIETNAM WAR: FORMING MEDIA NOSTALIGIA.....	30
4. GRENADA: UNPRECEDENTED MEDIA RESTRAINTS AND FORMATION OF THE MEDIA’S “COMPLAINT DISCOURSE”	44
5. THE INVASION OF PANAMA A TEST OF THE SIDLE REPORT	55
6. THE GULF WAR:REVISITING TURMOIL BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE MEDIA	65
7. REPORTING THE NEW WAR: PRESS COVERAGE AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM.....	80
8. METHODOLOGY	92
9. RESULTS.....	99
10. DISCUSSION.....	111
 APPENDIX.....	 124
REFERENCE LIST	129

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Primary Attributions Published from Jan.31 – Feb. 10, 1968	100
2. Primary Attributions Published Oct. 8-10, 2001.....	101
3. Comparison of Attributions from the Sample Periods	101
4. Photo Source and Type Published from Jan. 31 – Feb. 10, 1968	105
5. Photo Source and Sentiment Published from Jan. 31 – Feb. 10, 1968.....	107
6. Crosstabulation of Photo Type and Sentiment, Tet Offensive	107
7. Photo Source and Type Published from Oct. 8-18, 2001	108
8. Photo Source and Sentiment Published from Oct. 8-18, 2001	109
9. Crosstabulation of Photo Type and Sentiment, Afghanistan.....	110
10. Overall Percentage Figures for Photos Published During the Two Periods.....	110

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The concept and definition of democracy have changed dramatically since its inception. The meaning of democracy is broad in scope, and scholars and critics alike have attempted to find the true denotation of the democratic idea. The Greek philosopher Plato regarded democracy as “full of variety and disorder.” In his book *The Republic*, Plato writes:

Democracy then comes when the poor get the power, putting some who are against them to death, sending others away, and then letting everyone have an equal part in the rulers’ rights and offices. And most commonly in such governments the positions are given by lot (Plato, trans. 1960)

Although Plato’s view of the formation of democracy was critically pessimistic, the United States was founded upon democratic ideas. Immigrants from northern Europe came to escape oppression and gain eventual religious, economic, and political freedoms. To that end, early American democracy aspired to give total freedom to its people. The concept of a free press evolved from this essential idea of democracy. This idea was instilled in our democracy by the founders of the American experience. William Blackstone had an enormous influence upon the framers of the Constitution. He once wrote, “The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state” (Sunstein, 1993, p. xiii). The first amendment to the Constitution eventually stated, “Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” Unchanged since its creation, this statement became the doctrine of the American democratic system.

Essentially, our forefathers created three estates to help balance the power that Plato so openly criticized. Each estate (legislative, executive, and judicial) would ultimately become a watchdog of the other two branches of government. Often touted as the “fourth estate,” the press has been granted the inherent right to inform the public about political issues and public affairs, thus becoming a watchdog as well. But another entity must emerge for the success of any democracy; the American military must protect the concept of American democracy at home and abroad.

It appears, however, that no other domestic entity has challenged the freedom of the press clause set forth by the Constitution of the United States more than the American military (Kennedy, 1993; Young & Jesser, 1997). The relationship between the American news media and the military has often been shrouded by questions of censorship (Price, 1942; Sharkey, 1991; Hallin, 1986;), threats to national security (Braestrup, 1978; Mohr, 1983), and blatant or unknown falsehood (Hammond, 1998). Both institutions are imperative to American democracy (Fallows, 1996; Sharkey, 2001), but during times of war, tension inevitably grows between them.

The pinnacle of success for any democracy is the ability of citizens to receive unfiltered information about their government. It should be the obligation of the press to fulfill this role – ultimately becoming the vital link between the government and the public. Perhaps this is where the relationship between the military and the media is often damaged. The crucial relationship between the “people, their government and their Army” is dubbed by war theorist Carl von Clausewitz as the “remarkable trinity” (as cited in Summers, 1986, p. 6). The media, in turn, are the essential link between each element within this trinity. But in times of conflict, the media’s reporting often alters the

relationship among the entities of the trinity, causing deep military bitterness toward the media as a whole (Sharkey, 1991, p. 39).

As the young nation developed, the press quickly became the source for reaching people of the United States. Even during Revolutionary times, newspapers maintained the responsibility of reporting the events of conflict to the settlers within the developing country. Most newspapers, however, favored the cause for independence. Thus, this patriotic flare often caused embellishment of the truth from the battlefield, setting the stage for early hostile relationships between the media and the military, and forming what some would call a “liberal” press (Hammond, 1994). Ambrose Serle, an official charged with monitoring the colonial press, wrote home to England in 1776: “One is astonished to see avidity [newspapers]...are sought after, and how they are believed by the great Bulk of the People” (as cited in Hammond, 1994, p. 2087). And although coming very early in the new nation’s development, this epiphany would become the foundation for the evolution of the news media and the public’s perception of events facing the nation.

Media scholars often contend that the military sees the press as part of its own propagandistic apparatus during times of war. The news media often reflect public opinion. In turn, public opinion often mirrors the opinions of the news media. Napoleon had the belief that “three hostile newspapers are more to be feared than a thousand bayonets” (as cited in Hammond, 1994). It is no wonder, then, that early military objectives included keeping on good terms with the news media. However, as time progressed, the public’s perception of the media began to change, thus changing the military’s standpoint toward the press. In more recent times, the public’s perception of the press has evolved into a somewhat negative connotation.

In order to fully understand the failing relationship between the press and the military, it is important to examine this negative perception of the press by the public that both democratic entities intend to serve. Steven R. Van Hook, a media and public relations veteran, once wrote:

The history of the news media has been colorful...From the worst imaginable abuses of press power to the highest standards of public service, the media have played the full spectrum of hues and tones to catch the public's eyes and ears. (Hook, 1986, para. 1)

Hook's comments adequately reflect public sentiment. The public has long raised criticism about media intrusiveness, negativity, and bias (Center for Media and Public Affairs, 1997). In a study conducted by the Center for Media and Public Affairs (1997), a majority of respondents (52%) believed that the press abuses its First Amendment freedoms rather than use them responsibly. When asked to compare the traits of newspeople to those of other people, 42% described journalists as more arrogant, 31% as more cynical, and 33% as less compassionate.

But the public's negative perception of the press is not just geared toward the journalist. Many people believe that media organizations as a whole are distancing themselves from the public they serve. The media has emerged into a strong corporate institution. *Time* magazine columnist Thomas Griffith wrote:

The news is that the press is at last beginning to shed its romantic image of itself as the lone public defender pure of heart...To the public, the press is not David among Goliaths; it has become one of the Goliaths...[The media] seems as unreachable as the government or any big corporation. (Griffith, 1985, p. 57)

The public's negative perception of the press remains strong during wartime. A defining moment of such sentiment came when the Reagan administration completely excluded the press from the Grenada invasion. The public overwhelmingly supported the

administration's decision for such restrictions. Thus, a military victory against the press was apparent and, as this thesis will prove, would carry forth through subsequent wars.

Since our country's inception, it has been involved in a series of conflict, both internal and external. This thesis outlines the changes that have occurred in the relationship between the military and the news media during latter 20th century conflicts, and implications of these changes. In particular, this thesis will focus on five major U.S. operations: Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, the Gulf War, and the beginnings of war in Afghanistan. It will show the evolution of what should be termed as the media's "complaint discourse." This discourse is characterized by a pronouncement of First Amendment suppression and continually striving for unrestricted press access to the battlefield.

Two guiding factors have contributed to the evolution of change among the military and the news media. In order to begin an encompassing examination of such change, these two factors must be investigated.

Public Perception After Vietnam

A second major factor contributing to the critical relationship between the military and the media was the public's lingering view of the overall press coverage of the Vietnam War. The role of the media in Vietnam has been scrutinized by media scholars for decades. Many critics have placed the blame for lack of popular support of the war on the media's coverage from the battlefield (Braestrup, 1978, 1985; Hallin, 1986). According to Lyndon Johnson, it was the one-sided, negative images the media projected that caused the American people to turn against the military's efforts in Vietnam. In 1968, Richard Nixon further demonstrated this belief:

The Vietnam War was complicated by factors that had never occurred in America's conduct of war...The American news media had come to dominate domestic opinion about its purpose and conduct...The result was a serious demoralization of the home front. (Nixon, 1978, p. 350)

And although many scholars would disagree with such sentiment (Knightley, 1975; Sharkey, 1991; Wyatt, 1986), it still established the basis for future relations between the military and the media during conflict, forever changing the way wars would be covered. The lingering skepticism of military officials carried forth to subsequent wars.

Technology's Influence on the Media-Military Relationship

But probably the most defining factor that has contributed to the changing relationship between the media and the military is technology. Historically, evolving media technology has resulted in increased press restrictions, causing the relationship to become even more rigid. Veteran reporters can testify that the news media had easier access to military operations prior to, and including, the Vietnam War. Newsmen often accompanied troops in the battlefield, ultimately affecting the reporter as much as the military personnel – both mentally and physically. The effects of war have been shared by members of the press. World War II Correspondent Ernie Pyle wrote:

Writing is an exhausting and tearing thing. Most of the correspondents actually worked like slaves. Especially was this true of the press association of men. The result was that all of us who had been with the war for more than a year grew befogged. We were grimy, mentally as well as physically. We'd drained our emotions until they cringed from being called from hiding. We looked at bravery and death and battlefield waste and new countries almost as blind men, seeing only faintly and not really wanting to see at all. I am not writing this to make heroes of correspondents, because only a few look upon themselves in any dramatic light whatever. I am writing it to let you know that correspondents, too, can get sick of war – and deadly tired. (as cited in James, 1991, p. 51)

Pyle's words personify the feelings felt by early war correspondents. However, most of these correspondents would have it no other way. Reporters got their story and informed

the public about happenings on the battlefield, upholding their democratic duties.

However, as firearms became more powerful, the safety of war correspondents became increasingly threatened. Throughout the 19th century, the accuracy and speed of weapons increased, culminating with the invention of the machine gun. This made accompanying troops on the battlefield even more deadly for journalists, and became a crucial factor in the way modern wars would be reported. In fact, in the onslaught of press restrictions that dominated the media-military relationship in the 1980s and 1990s, the safety of newspeople became the most prominent Pentagon excuse for press exclusion.

Technology also provided a venue for immediacy in reporting. With the advent of the steamship, the railroad, and the telegraph, news from the front traveled increasingly faster, making military officials skeptical and nervous. So by the time the Vietnam War – aptly called the “television war” (Arlen, 1982, p. 70) – ended, the relationship between the military and the press was at an all-time low. In addition, when the United States military invaded the island of Grenada in 1983, satellite transmission was in its infancy. But in a matter of 10 years, the advances in technology were crucial in how correspondents reported events. The ability to transmit pictures of wartime into living rooms of the world had increased exponentially in the years leading up to the Persian Gulf War. Walter Gantz wrote, “If Vietnam was the first television war, ‘Operation Desert Storm’ was the first brought home by satellite, sometimes live and in living color” (Gantz, 1993, p. 1). As television spectators, the American public watched the green glow of Baghdad while bombs exploded key targets around the city. The Gulf War proved to be an enormous media event, defining the use of satellite systems and new media outlets such as the Cable News Network (CNN). During the first few hours of the operation in

the Gulf, Americans and others around the world tuned to CNN as it provided live coverage through a unique electronic hook-up to Baghdad. “For a period, it seemed as if the world had turned to CNN,” wrote Gantz (Gantz, 1993, p. 1).

With each new technological advance came the public’s preference for new media outlets. Television has emerged as the main source of news for the majority of the American public. But, perhaps what is most disturbing to military officials about television is its entertainment value. And unfortunately, television media have often been criticized for conforming to this aspect of the medium. James Fallows, Washington editor of *The Atlantic Monthly*, wrote, “Mainstream journalism has made the mistake of trying to compete with the pure entertainment media – music, TV, celebrities, movies – on their own terms. But this is a losing game” (Fallows, 1996, p. 244).

The shift in allegiance between television and newspapers by the public occurred during the 1960’s – more specifically during the Vietnam War (Hallin, 1986). But for some media scholars, this shift was not a welcomed venture. Leonard Downie, Jr. and Robert Kaiser, both of the *Washington Post*, writes about the differences between newspaper and television reporting:

Television and newspapers both perform vital public services, but they aren’t the same services. Television brings great events to the public, allows us all to participate vicariously in the making of history...Newspapers, at least the better ones, are much more ambitious. Their public service is to bring a rich, detailed account of yesterday in the world to their readers every day, an account that enables citizens to remain in touch with numerous aspects of contemporary life in their community, country and world. (Downie & Kaiser, 2002, pp. 66-67)

What the two authors concede is the immediacy of television does not allow for a thorough examination of events, unlike the reporting style of television. It is this immediacy and impact of the images of television that causes the public to prefer the

medium (Gitlin, 2001). But at the same time, these same aspects appear to cause a kink in the relationship between the military and the media.

The technological advancements in both reporting and combat techniques have caused an overall disappearance of the nostalgic war coverage that American correspondents once prospered from, and still yearn for today. And although the complaint discourse of reporters continues to strengthen, the possibility of returning to the journalists' vision of unrestricted press access is all but lost due to such advancements.

Historical Perspectives

Chapters 2-7 provide the historical framework for this thesis, chronicling the media's "complaint discourse" and how it strengthened after each subsequent war. Chapter 2 explores the evolution of change in the relationship between the military and the media, spanning nearly two centuries of American history. It provides a brief overview of changes from the Revolutionary period to the conflict in Korea. The chapter gives examples of changing technology that contributed to the change and reflects upon public opinion during these eras.

Chapter 3 focuses on the Vietnam War and how it ultimately changed the way future wars would be presented by the media. Shrouded by claims of false reports by government officials and pessimism and bias from the media, this war provides the most enduring evidence of why restrictions are placed on the press and why the relationship between the two entities continue to decline. The chapter discusses the television media's role in covering the events of the conflict and defines the implications of such reporting, both on the media profession and military procedures. It explores the erosion of trust

between the military and the media and how this mistrust factor ultimately carried over to future operations. It is the nostalgic atmosphere of reporting the Vietnam War that reporters today still attempt to grasp on to.

Chapter 4 discusses “Operation Urgent Fury” in Grenada in 1983, in which the American press was excluded entirely from the initial mission. Although this was the first time the military placed such restrictions on the media, it set precedence in the way future wars would be covered (Sharkey, 1991; Braestrup, 1985; Diederich, 1984). To make matters worse for the American media, the American public was supportive of the Pentagon’s restrictions, allowing future limitations to be set forth without public outcries. This chapter also explores the media’s concern about receiving only government-filtered information as opposed to reporting first-hand accounts. In addition, the chapter delves into conditions of the Sidle Report – a series of recommendations set forth to improve the military-media relationship. Chapter 4 also explores the implementation of the national press pool system and discusses the ramifications of such system.

Chapter 5 presents the events of “Operation Urgent Fury” in Panama in 1989. The conflict in Panama became a test of the recommendations set forth by the Sidle Report, including the creation of the national press pool system. The chapter discusses several physical and technical obstacles reporters had to face in reporting the conflict as well as the military’s lack of accommodation to the correspondents regarding these obstacles. From a journalistic standpoint, the deployment of the press pool in Panama was a dismal failure. This chapter examines new stipulations agreed upon by both the media and the military to improve reporting standards during later wars.

Chapter 6 provides an analysis of the relationship between the military and the media during the Persian Gulf War. It chronicles the press' struggle with access to the front lines, as well as the military's refusal to such access. The implications of such press restrictions are also discussed, both from a media and military standpoint. Technology played an enormous role in the reporting of the Gulf War. This chapter discusses the media's role in the conflict as a result of technological advances. In particular, chapter 6 takes an in-depth look at the Cable News Network and its presence during the conflict and how it changed the face of war reporting.

Chapter 7 is an analysis of Operations "Enduring Freedom" and "Anaconda" in Afghanistan in late 2001 and early 2002. The war in Afghanistan opened a new scope for journalists. And although referred to as an unconventional war, the war in Afghanistan produced a juxtaposition of recent war coverage and pre-Vietnam reporting. As an example, this chapter discusses the deployment of both the national press pool system and an embedded press system that were both implemented during the conflict. Kathleen Kirby wrote:

Indeed, our nation's war against terrorism – a war defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld has characterized as "a war like none other our nation has faced" – has rekindled conflicts between the news media and the administration over press freedom and national security. Those tensions are further complicated by a surge in patriotism following the horrific attacks on American soil, the necessarily covert nature of the resulting military operations, and the advances in technology that enable news to travel around the world with lightening speed. (Kirby, 2001, para. 2)

Covering a "war like none other our nation has faced" resulted in the kind of reporting that the journalistic professional had never faced. This chapter discusses not only this aspect but also the Pentagon's attempt to find middle ground in satisfying the media's

need to report on military operations. This chapter also analyzes media criticism in dealing with terrorist activities and its conformation to public sentiment.

The underlying theoretical perspective for this research is that technology has changed the face of war reporting so dramatically that the possibility of returning to journalists' utopian vision of unlimited press access to the battlefield is unattainable. Chapter 8 discusses the methodology used in this research, including the overall use of content analysis as a research method. In particular, two specific time periods – January 31 – February 10, 1968 and October 8 – 18, 2001 – are sampled using *The New York Times* as the primary text.

This thesis sets out to answer three primary research questions to test the validity of reporters' complaints about press suppression since the Vietnam era. These questions were developed using the discourse analysis of previous researchers presented in the first seven chapters. The research questions are as follows:

Research Question 1: How have government restrictions placed on the press after the Vietnam War affected the way reporters use first-hand accounts in their coverage of conflict?

Research Question 2: In the same regards, how have the press restrictions affected the way photographs are obtained during conflict?

Research Question 3: Does the published photo's source determine the sentiment portrayed within the photograph?

The quantitative results presented in Chapter 9 attempts to answer these three questions. Yet it is the qualitative results intertwined throughout the chapter that will prove the inability to return to the nostalgic war reporting sought after by modern war correspondents.

CHAPTER 2

THE EVOLUTION OF CONFLICT: REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD TO KOREA

In upholding the democratic idea, war is inevitable. The United States military has seen action in all parts of the globe and in all types of landscapes – mountains, deserts, jungles, and caves. And for the most part, the American media have been at the forefront of these domains, accompanying troops and informing the public of occurrences.

Nathaniel Lande writes, “Typewriter patriots, equipped with telegraphs, radio microphones, or satellite links, have been the conduit for a public eager to imagine and feel every musket fire and missile blast from Lexington to Baghdad” (Lande, 1998, p. xi).

The press’ role has evolved over the years. The media have fostered nationalism, offered skepticism, supported patriotism, questioned judgment, and formed and reflected public opinion. But above all, the press’ main responsibility was to inform. And in attempting to do so, conflict often arises. James Monroe observed that the concept of a free press was so central to the formation of our American democracy that there was “not one recorded objection” to the idea when the Bill of Rights was framed (Hammond, 1994, p. 2085). So if this ideal was central to the successful creation of our country, why has the military been the key proponent in obstructing this inherent right? Perhaps criticism of military officials and campaigns, impending censorship restraints, and security infractions alluded to problems between the two entities. Although problems existed, the relationship seemed to be fairly neutral through almost two centuries of our

nation's history. This chapter attempts to outline the many changes in the relationship between the military and the media from the country's inception up to the Vietnam era. In order to understand where this relationship is now, it is imperative to revisit the past.

The Revolutionary Press

The war for independence, like many subsequent wars, was often referred to as a public opinion war. It was fought that way on the battlefield, and fought that way in print. Newspapers of the time were often filled with embellishments and passionate accounts more than factual reports. Oftentimes, the reports and commentaries reflected the opinion of the newspaper's publisher. However, General Washington and his commanders used the press – along with churches, town meetings, and other entities of the civilian community – to carry forth his efforts and his objectives. Many newspapers enjoyed wide circulation throughout the colonies. For example, the *Connecticut Courant* had 8,000 readers in 1778 (Hammond, 1994, p. 2087). And although he realized that the press rarely corrected blatant mistakes within their pages, Washington understood the public scope of newspapers and used the news media to further the cause for independence (Hammond, 1994, p. 2087).

The Revolutionary War did not have war correspondents, *per se*. News from the front initially arrived as unconfirmed rumors. Many newspapers relied on letters from stringers in the battlefield. If a battle was not covered by these so-called stringers, the newspaper often printed reports submitted by commanding officers. Regardless of the way the news was disseminated, it was usually not timely. Weeks often passed before battles were written about.

Although the Revolutionary Press is often accused of providing false information to the people of the colonies, Thomas Jefferson was one of the unfaltering defenders of a free press. In a letter to Colonial Edward Carrington on January 16, 1787, Jefferson wrote:

The basis of our government being the opinion of the people, the very first object should be to keep that right; and if it were left up to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter. (Boyd, 1950, pp. 48-49)

And with these sentiments, the democratic importance of the American newspaper was understood.

Wars of Expansion: The War of 1812 and Mexican War

With the purchase of the Louisiana Territory from France in 1803, the growing United States secured land that would be marked by cash crop cultivation and steamship traffic. Only three decades after the American Revolution, the population of the United States had more than doubled. True commercialization was occurring as the expansion of the nation continued. But with this expansion of commerce, both territorial and oceanic, conflict between the British Empire in Canada and the United States erupted into the War of 1812. And although the war was small and usually fought on distant fronts, the news media was active in covering the war.

Poor communications between the press and the military hindered attempts to report the war to the public. Just like Revolutionary War reporting, editors relied mostly on letters sent by eye witnesses. These letters, however,

often reached American soil days or weeks after battles took place. And in any case, the news that reached the editors' desks was often plagued with inaccuracies and contradictory statements. During the War of 1812, much of what was printed was editorial commentary. This commentary was filtered with sarcasm and mudslinging – adapted from journalistic standards of the time.

Lande writes, “The War of 1812 does not receive much attention from today’s historians, but except for the Civil War, it was perhaps the most hotly debated conflict in which the country has ever been involved in...Americans were bitterly divided by political party loyalties, economic considerations, religious views or patriotic and national sentiment” (Lande, 1998, p. 46). And so, journalism of this era often contained much propaganda and attempted to reflect public opinion – a reflection that was often contradictory of journalism ethics, filled with inaccuracies, narratives, and self-political views. Thus, the government’s view of the press held a negative connotation.

And during the years that followed the War of 1812, relations between the military and the media continued to diminish. As the United States became more and more commercialized, many entrepreneurs discovered that money could be made in the newspaper business. The advancement of nineteenth century technology – the magnetic telegraph, the steamship, and the railroad – made it possible to disseminate news rapidly. It was such advancements that would eventually contribute to much strife between the media and the military. The

Mexican War was the first war that allowed such advancements to be utilized in reporting.

Unlike previous wars, the wide use of the telegraph allowed the American people to follow the events of the Mexican War very closely, and in a somewhat timely fashion. Reporters accompanied troops and wrote dispatches from the battlefield. In some cases, army officers doubled as reporters as well. In fact, many filed their reports with the newspapers before completing any reports for their superior officers (Lande, 1998).

Although the Mexican War was short, some notable firsts in American journalism was accomplished. Competition was paramount for newspapers of the era. Therefore, the need for fast news was integrated into the everyday operations of the news media. Competing papers formed a cooperative arrangement that relayed information by steamboat to New Orleans, where it was quickly telegraphed to media outlets throughout the United States. Some newspapers, such as the *American Star*, *American Eagle*, and *Tampico Sentinel*, printed single-page news sheets directly from the battlefield (Lande, 1998).

News traveled more quickly than in any previous wars, contributing to the competitive nature of the newspapers – a concern for officers of the American military. Many newspapers went to great expense to make sure their readership received the news of the war first. The New York *Herald* kept a vessel at sea that would intercept news from steamships and then rushed to the docks where typesetters awaited. The New Orleans *Picayune* hired a typesetter aboard its ship

so that reports could be sent immediately to the awaiting press. Newspapers often printed a special edition if the news proved to be important. These “Extras” were distributed by newsboys immediately following printing. At times, newspapers printed up to four editions a day and often sold out of each one. According to Lande (1998), the Mexican War ultimately allowed the penny press to flourish.

Also unlike many previous wars, coverage of the war was marked by accuracy, relying on eyewitness reports from the front. Reports from the field were given top printing priority. The Baltimore *Sun* showed the aggressiveness of war reporting during the Mexican War. In April 1847, a pony express rider brought news that Veracruz had fallen – a critical victory in the war effort. Aware that his rider was a day ahead of the War Department’s courier, the *Sun*’s publisher notified President Polk of the news. It was the first word of victory to reach the White House. Historian Robert Henry wrote that the Mexican War was “the first war in history to be adequately and comprehensively reported in the daily press” (Lande, 1998, p. 52).

The Civil War Press

Before the onslaught of the American Civil War, more than 50,000 miles of telegraph wire spanned the United States, thus giving reporters a reliable, technological means to cover the war. This extensive network of telegraph wire allowed reporters to transmit dispatches straight from the front lines.

Competition among newspapers once again flourished during the Civil War. Oftentimes, the first reports were rewarded with \$25 bonuses. However, editors exhibited very little regard for accuracy if it meant that a competitor might publish the story first. At times, fictitious news stories were the result of such heralded rewards. Civil War reporter Henry Villard, commented, “To print the first, however incorrect and incomplete intelligence was the height of their ambition, and it often happened to correspondents that, instead of receiving credit for trustworthiness, they were censured for tardiness” (Villard, 1861). And although the reporting styles of the Civil War might not have been entirely accurate, it was a substantial improvement over past decades of war. The newspapers of the 1860s printed news whether it was good or bad. During the war, correspondents began to emerge as an individual entity on the battlefield.

Advancements in war reporting changed the face of war for the American public. With the advent of the camera, Civil War photographers conveyed the brutality of battle and diminished the romantic view of war once thought of by the citizens of the nation. And in turn, a new breed of journalism took shape. The military could no longer hide the tragedy and grim details of the battle field from the photojournalists. And new connotations of war were introduced into the homes of the American people. In 1961 – 100 years after the Civil War – Robert Penn reflected on such connotations:

When the smoke of battle had cleared away, the American was apt to see that there had been a bloody collision between two absolute and uncompromising views of how society should be operated. Looking about

him at the carnage, he was likely to say that he had had enough of such absolutes, and to decide never to permit anything like them again. (Warren, 1961, p. 83)

But for the military, a continuing struggle with the press emerged. Many newspaper correspondents regularly released sensitive information in their dispatches. It was documented that General Robert E. Lee read northern newspapers avidly throughout the war to learn of the Northern army's movements and objectives. Competition was too intense, and the news media and the military could not find common ground as to what kind of information should be withheld. Eventually, the War Department imposed censorship after the First Battle of Bull Run. Northern commanders considered limiting press access to operations in the field. Lincoln suppressed many newspapers across the country for sedition. General Sherman often questioned the government's willingness to allow newsmen to accompany troops into battle. But, the hunger of the divided American people for the news on the front stopped any inclination of limiting press access. During the Civil War, newspaper circulation in New York City alone increased as much as five times whenever word was announced about a major battle. Troops themselves relied on newspapers to deliver news from other fronts. Hammond remarked:

During a lull in the Battle of Cedar Creek in October 1864, observers later remarked, the first thing soldiers did all along the line was to sit down, boil coffee, and pull out old issues of whatever newspapers they had at hand in an attempt to make some sense of the holocaust that had descended upon them. (Hammond, 1994, p. 2090)

And although the relationship between the press and military was not an amiable one at the time, both ultimately needed each other during the war. But as the war continued, good reporters were promoted, retired, or killed. In turn, second-rate reporters came to dominate the scene – reporters that Villard said were more fit “to drive cattle than to write for newspapers” (Villard, 1861).

But several correspondents, such as Villard, emerged as influential individuals in war reporting. The New York *Tribune* correspondent George Smalley reported on the Battle of Antietam in 1862, supplying the first accurate account received by President Lincoln of what occurred during what is considered the bloodiest single day of the Civil War. This report is still considered one of the greatest pieces of writing to come out of the war, representing the utmost accuracy and clarity.

War During the “Yellow Age of Journalism”

Following the Civil War, relations between the press and the military remained unstable. Although a reporter died with General Custer at the Battle of Little Big Horn in 1876, most reporters who accompanied military operations were not highly regarded among officers. And as the inception of yellow journalism occurred in the 1890s, little was done to improve the relationship.

When the Spanish-American War began in 1898, journalism was marked by sensationalistic coverage. And although objectivity is a key requirement among today’s reporters, most often it was cast aside in favor of a sensational report.

Before fighting even erupted, William Randolph Hearst, publisher of the *New York Journal*, sent artist Frederic Remington to Cuba to sketch any skirmishes he came upon. Using a telegraph, Remington wrote to Hearst, “Everything quiet. No trouble here. There will be no war. I wish to return.” And the reply from Hearst lives on in journalistic history: “Please remain. You furnish the pictures and I will furnish the war” (Lande, 1998, p. 127). And this practice adopted by Hearst would continue when the United States eventually declared war on Spain.

The government did attempt to impose censorship on the press at the time of the Spanish-American War. However, the large number of reporters that arrived to chronicle the war efforts made the process difficult to enforce. The press’ criticism of military officers as well as reports on the poor training of troops, lack of food, and disease that inflicted the troops on a daily basis, caused military officials to view the press in a negative way. General William R. Shafter, the commander of U.S. expeditionary force to Cuba, reflected this attitude. When the *New York Herald* reporter Richard Harding Davis requested to go ashore with the first wave of troops at Daiquiri, Shafter reacted by saying, “I don’t give a damn who you are. I’ll treat you all alike” (Hammond, 1994, p. 2092). This attitude would carry over into subsequent wars.

The Development of Modern War Reporting: Two World Wars

When preparations began for the United States’ involvement in World War I, Secretary of War Newton Baker appointed Major Douglas MacArthur as a mediator between the war department and the increasing number of journalists

who reported on the activities of the department. By issuing press releases and granting interviews, MacArthur ultimately helped the media and the American public understand the purpose for U.S. involvement in the first World War – thus establishing the need for a public relations office during war time.

Prior to U.S. involvement in the war, both the British and French governments excluded journalists from the battlefield completely. Lloyd George, British Prime Minister, told the editor of the *Manchester Guardian*, “If the people really knew, the war would be stopped tomorrow. But of course they don’t know and can’t know” (Hammond, 1994, p. 2094).

However, when the United States entered the war, the military allowed reporters greater freedom to accompany the troops. The competition of the newspapers during the era had increased exponentially. And although commanders attempted to limit the number of reporters allowed on the front, so many reporters arrived that a possible limitation was not feasible. At one point during the war, 411 correspondents were present.

The American military was very cautious in handling the press. Reporters who wished to become regular correspondents during the war had to adhere to a lengthy process of accreditation. This process included making an appearance before the secretary of war, submitting a \$10,000 bond to assure proper conduct in the field, and taking an oath to uphold truth. And even though freedom of the press epitomizes democratic principles, censors were put into place to monitor the news from the front. The censors allowed general facts about the war to be

reported, but often tried to soften the hideous details of some battles. The reporters had little choice but to cooperate with the censors, complying with the rules in an effort to establish a working relationship. World War I reporter Raymond Tompkins wrote:

The censorship irked them and they hated it at first, but gradually they grew used to it and wrote what they could, working up all the “human interest stuff” available and learning quickly that the censors loved it and almost invariably passed it – provided it said nothing about the drinking, stealing and rugged *amours* of the *soldat Americain* (Hammond, 1994, p. 2096).

And although the censors were quick in attempts to soften the effects of bad news, the public did not seem to mind. Military managers were quick to brush the press aside in matters of war, and correspondents found it difficult to get a good story. In 1919, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote, “When a nation is at war, many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be tolerated so long as men fight” (Teeter, 1998, p. 21). This statement would ultimately personify the feelings the military had in relation to the press – sentiments that would be carried forth in subsequent wars.

In the years between the two world wars, the military gave an abundance of thought as to what its relationship with the press should be. The U.S. Army set precedence in establishing a working relationship with the press. Its press relations section became the chief informant between the public and the press about the army’s objectives.

When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941, a rare cooperation between the military and the press occurred. Knowing that democracies could not successfully wage a war without popular support, both entities worked together to obtain success. Officials at all levels of the military worked to keep the press informed about occurrences without alerting the enemy about pertinent information. Editors and publishers readily cooperated with the military by working closely with the director of censorship Byron Price in establishing a voluntary “Code of Wartime Practices.” The stipulations of this code defined the categories of information of use to an enemy. Correspondents would not report on troop movements, descriptions of planned operations, shipping schedules, or facts and figures on the Allies’ order of battle. In October 1942, Price delivered a speech at the *New York Times* forum on “News Dissemination in Wartime, stating:

Censorship is a necessary evil of wartime. We have known it in some form during every war in our history. In present time, when war is all-out and globe-encircling, censorship is a vital weapon. Its function is to attack the communications of the enemy, to hamper him on every front and every flank, to keep from him vital information of our own war effort and to gather such information as may be possible about his plans and purposes. Surely it cannot be disputed that this is not only useful but an indispensable part of total warfare such as we know today. (Price, 1942, p. 158)

And although in the same speech he says, “This is a war for freedom, and to mention freedom and censorship in the same breath might appear a contradiction of terms,” (Price, 1942, p. 158) the press openly accepted the guidelines set forth by the Office of Censorship.

Just prior to World War II, the radio had become a supreme prime means of transmitting news. Civilians depended on the radio broadcasts from Europe as their means of information. In addition, hundreds of newspaper correspondents followed troops throughout the European theater. A special uniform was even developed for American reporters on the front lines.

Although in the beginning of the war a certain cooperation existed, as the conflict progressed, this cooperation soon declined. Correspondents complained that the navy withheld information about the battles of Midway and the Coral Sea too long to simply satisfy proper security measures. During the North African campaign (1942-1943), many news stories never reached their destinations or reached it too late. Similarly, it took 28 hours for the first combat reports about the Invasion of Normandy to reach newspapers in the United States.

But overall, despite some criticism by members of the press, enough information was made available for the satisfaction of most reporters. In working closely with members of the media, some trusted correspondents in North Africa received a month's warning in advance of the invasion of Sicily. In the same respects, a pool of four reporters who accompanied General Eisenhower learned the planned date, time, and location of the Normandy invasion well in advance. William L. Laurence, the science reporter for the *New York Times*, received pertinent information about the Manhattan Project five months prior to the atomic bomb attacks on Japan.

Relations between the press and the military during World War II were deemed amicable. Very few criticisms from either side emerged. However, some outspoken critics conveyed their thoughts about the use of censors during wartime. In his novel *Once There Was a War*, author John Steinbeck believed the press cooperated so well with the censors that it often isolated the public from the war's reality. Journalist Philip Knightley suggested that the public was told exactly what the government wanted them to hear and nothing else. Such criticism would arise again in future wars and set the stage for a new age of war reporting.

The Korean War

Perhaps the greatest struggle between the press and the military occurred during the Korean conflict. Riding on the fact that the American public was not in favor of the war, the writings of the press often reflected public opinion. Reporting was often characterized by criticism of the campaign.

MacArthur, the U.S. commander in Japan at the time, imposed a system of voluntary guidelines for reporters that allowed them to say what they wanted. However, the stipulations made them personally responsible for violations of security. The problematic details of these guidelines included the fact that many members of the military were uncertain as to what constituted a security violation. And because of extreme competition among media outlets, the problems between the military and press intensified. Basically, what one reporter would consider a security violation, another would often print. Loose interpretations of security

measures occurred frequently. Revelations of security information occurred almost on a daily basis. One correspondent even revealed the impending landing at Inchon in September 1950 nearly 10 hours in advance. Because of such breaches in security, MacArthur was forced to implement censorship during the war.

Although the censors were able to reduce security violations, they could not halt them completely. No provisions were ever made to stop reporters from outside the area from revealing security information. In fact, on June 18, 1951, *Newsweek* published a detailed map revealing the order of battle for MacArthur's troops. The same infraction occurred in October when the magazine revealed the battle order for the entire Eighth Army.

With the few aforementioned exceptions, the military and the press did work well together during the Korean War. Reporters rarely complained about the censors; and the censors did a fairly good job informing the press. The few inevitable mistakes did not overshadow the somewhat harmonious relationship between the press and the military. However, detrimental mistakes would change this relationship during the next major conflict – the Vietnam War.

Conclusion

It is important to understand that through the first two centuries of our nation's existence, the relationship between the press and military spouted some conflicts. But overall, they worked together in the protection of democracy.

Certain restrictions on the press were made, and for the most part, were followed by press corps members. But as technology changed, and war efforts became more controversial, the positive relationship reached its apex, and the rapid decline of a positive relationship occurred almost immediately. It is this decline that affected the overall reporting of subsequent operations: Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, the Gulf War, and Afghanistan.

CHAPTER 3

THE VIETNAM WAR: FORMING MEDIA NOSTALGIA

The war in Vietnam divided our nation's people, government, and democratic institutions. Ultimate defeat in Vietnam carried with it even more divisibility. But at the heart of this defeat and disillusionment came harsh criticism of the media by the military. Even more divisive has been the debate as to the media's role in the latter parts of the conflict. For the most part, the relationship between the media and the military remained manageable at the end of the Korean War (Lande, 1998; Hammond, 1994). The two institutions continued to work together to fulfill a democratic destiny. But it has been argued that the turning point in the detrimental relationship between the military and the press occurred during the Vietnam conflict (Braestrup, 1985; Sharkey, 1991; Hammond, 1998) .

The Vietnam War has often been described as America's "television war" (Arlen, 1982). Because this was the first war to stream into the living rooms of concerned citizens, Americans saw the conflict first hand. And although the once romantic view of war had long since diminished, the reality had never been seen so vividly. Previously, the public relied on newspapers to deliver the somewhat delayed news of conflict. But Vietnam was entirely different. The news media – specifically the television news media – helped establish public opinion by the simple pictures that came from the front lines (Goodnow, 1968; Knightley, 1975; Mandelbaum, 1982). The crucial aspect of a televised

war is impact. Conflict was not glamorized, but rather emotionally and brutally depicted.

Lyndon Johnson explained the impact of the media's presence in Vietnam:

As I sat in my office last evening waiting to speak, I thought of the many times each week when television brings the war into the American home. No one can say exactly what effect those vivid scenes have on American opinion. Historians must only guess at the effect that television would have had during earlier conflicts on the future of this Nation. (Mandelbaum, 1982, p. 157)

Johnson's idea is very clear. It is his assumption that if previous wars had been televised, the United States might not have persevered in fighting them. This sentiment is reflected in the writings of media and military scholars alike. One central question asked after the conflict was, "Did the press lose the war in Vietnam?" It is apparent that the media had a profound effect on public opinion during the course of the war. And perhaps losing the support of the American people ultimately caused the defeat in Vietnam. As previously referenced, the success of any war fought by a democracy depends on the support of the people.

In order to understand the current relationship between the military and the media, one must revisit the past – particularly Vietnam. Memories of Vietnam have affected every successive U.S. military operation. The war became the turning point in the poor relationship between the two institutions. And media scholars often set the Tet offensive in 1968 as the eventual change in the relationship. Shifts toward pessimism, criticism, and regret were apparent in the media's coverage after the Tet offensive. However, the Vietnam War not only changed the military's perception of the press, but it also changed the public's perception as well. This chapter attempts to answer questions of blame as well as show the evolutionary change in perception of the media by both the public and the military.

Television: The Preferred Medium

In order to understand the changing public and military perception of the press during the Vietnam conflict, it is important to look at the evolution of television news coverage during the period. Just as in previous wars – and subsequent wars – evolving technology often causes strife between the media and the military. During the Vietnam era, it is television that persists as the technological advance in war reporting. It can be argued that this advancement forever changed the face of war and war reporting (Mandelbaum, 1982; Hallin, 1986; James 1991). Television should be perceived as a decisive influence on public opinion during this time. A series of surveys conducted by the Roper Organization for Television Information in 1964 showed that for the first time in history, more people received most of their news from television. With multiple responses permitted, 58% of respondents said television was their main source of news; 56% said newspapers; 26% said radio; and 8% said magazines (Hallin, 1986, p. 106). In fact, by 1972 – three years prior to the pull-out of American troops in Vietnam – TV led newspapers 64% to 50%. Many scholars have attributed this to two factors: 1) the personal nature of the medium and 2) the presence of pictures (Hallin, 1986, Gitlin, 2001). Both factors contribute to the main focus of television in war coverage – the definitive impact of the medium.

Daniel Hallin, who provided extensive research into Vietnam and the press, concluded that the effectiveness television had on the public's perception of the war boiled down to two main principles. First, because it is a visual medium, television shows the raw horror of war in a way print media could not. Although magazines such as *Life*, *Time* and *Newsweek* vividly portrayed life on the front through their photos, the visual

aspect of television's moving pictures infiltrated America's homes. Second, television seemed to focus on the negative more than its print counterpart. This biased reporting has been reiterated by media scholars since the end of the Vietnam War. And it is this biased reporting that would set precedence for future war coverage.

The United States troops were never actually defeated militarily, but the images that streamed into America's homes via television convinced the public that the war was not winnable. Critics accuse the television media of presenting a one-sided image that was detrimental to United States foreign policy and would eventually turn the America public away from support of the war. To critics and national leaders, it was the media that determined the outcome of the war, not the military. Richard Nixon explained:

The Vietnam War was complicated by factors that had never before occurred in America's conduct of war...The American news media had come to dominate domestic opinion about its purpose and conduct...The result was a serious demoralization of the home front. (as cited in Bindas, 1990, p. 63)

This was not always the case, however. Both Hallin (1986) and William Hammond (1988, 1998), senior historian with the U.S. Army's Center of Military History, concluded that the media were accurate and supportive of the United States involvement in South Vietnam at the beginning of the war. However, when popular consensus changed in regards to the war, television's negative portrayals began to occur. Thus, the relationship between the media and the military began to fail quickly.

One may argue that the difference between the Vietnam War and other previous wars lay in the perception of the conflict, not overall operations or military conduct. And this perception lies in the advent of television. Television was the single most influential factor that changed the opinions of not only the public, but many government officials.

Vice President Hubert Humphrey summed up American sentiment about the “living room war”:

...This is the first war in this nation’s history that has been fought on television where the actors are real. Where, in the quiet of your living room of your home, or your dormitory, or wherever you may be, these cruel, ugly, dirty facts of life and death in war and pain and suffering come right to you; and it isn’t Hollywood acting. I’ve had letters from mothers that have seen their boys shot down in battle... (Goodnow, 1969, p. 141)

Good Relations Go Bad

Unlike the Korean War, Vietnam began with the news media and the military on relatively good terms. As a result, coverage of the conflict was free of virtually any kind of censorship. Like in previous conflicts, a system of voluntary guidelines by the press that withheld information from the enemy was instituted in the coverage of the war. In fact, many media scholars believe that Vietnam was the most openly reported war of modern times. For the most part, correspondents were able to go where they pleased and describe the war as they saw fit. The military went to great lengths to provide transportation, meals, shelter, and abundant briefings to the U.S. press corps. Military commanders illustrated great confidence in the media as a whole. In turn, the media portrayed the American soldier and his commander positively.

Early press coverage of the United States involvement in Vietnam showed indications of criticism, however. In 1958, Bernard Fall wrote in *The Nation* that “the disappointment is real and growing” (Fall, 1958, p. 491) concerning South Vietnam and its leadership. But *The Nation* was not the only periodical press that criticized early involvement. Beginning with South Vietnam President Ngo Dinh Diem’s claim to power in 1955 through the attempted coup in November 1960, the periodical press focused on

the failures of the South Vietnamese leader and questioned U.S. foreign aid. These early strains would only broaden as America was pulled into what many military analysts termed an unwinnable war.

Early media restrictions during the conflict were adopted to prevent “frivolous, thoughtless criticism” of the South Vietnamese government (Hammond, 1988, p. 15). These restrictions were outlined in Cable 1006, a directive from the U.S. Information Agency, the State Department and the Defense Department. The directive placed restrictions on the press in 1962 – three years before U.S. combat forces were sent to South Vietnam. The directive ordered military officials to make certain that journalists did not accompany military operations that might result in news stories that were unfavorable toward U.S. policy. The edict stated that efforts must be made to emphasize the South Vietnamese role in the war, mainly because “it is not...in our interest...to have stories indicating that Americans are leading and directing combat missions against the Viet Cong” (Hammond, 1988, p. 15). Cable 1006 certainly challenged the credibility of the government in the eyes of the news media. Early reporters understood the implications of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, but were unable to deliver the full story to the American people.

Another prime restriction that harmed this credibility involved the State Department and Pentagon orders that prohibited military briefers from talking about South Vietnamese matters unless that information was cleared by the government of South Vietnam. The erosion of trust culminated as the White House and Pentagon made a decision to conceal the extent of the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.

Early correspondents were outraged at the restrictions on information. Homer Bigart, a *New York Times* correspondent, wrote that American officials who criticized the South Vietnamese government were “tracked down” and ordered not to talk with journalists. In addition, he said that “correspondents who send gloomy dispatches are apt to be upbraided for lack of patriotism” (Bigart, 1962, p. 1A).

During the early years, the relationship between the military and the media reached a low point after the battle of Ap Bac in January 1963. In this battle, South Vietnamese forces, accompanied by U.S. advisors, surrounded a company of Viet Cong. However, due to numerous mistakes, the enemy was allowed to escape. Losses to the South Vietnamese occurred and three U.S. advisors were killed. When stories broke about the incident, General Paul D. Harkins, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, attempted to offer an optimistic account of the attack calling the Ap Bac battle a victory. Many journalists were convinced that military spokesmen were continually lying to them. Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford said U.S. officials made a severe error in dismissing journalists’ stories during this period:

One area we failed to investigate during those early years of the American buildup was the growing gap between the optimistic reports of progress that were coming in through the official chain of command and the increasingly skeptical reporting by some of the journalists covering the war...Even though those skeptical reports were based in part on the views of many junior American officers serving as advisers to the South Vietnamese Army, the Administration viewed the reports as a public-relations nuisance rather than as something that needed to be looked at carefully...It was a serious oversight on our part. (Clifford, 1991, p. 46)

Some government officials placed the blame on such restrictions on the South Vietnamese government, which did not “understand the free American press” (Hilsman, 1963, p. 389). Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, said

that information policies of the United States dictated that it is “essential that the American people have available the fullest possible picture of what is happening in Vietnam and our role there...reporters should be given the widest possible access to news and information on Vietnam” (Hilsman, 1963, p. 388).

In early 1964, less than a year after Hilsman’s comments, the American people, as well as members of Congress, were exposed to the role of the United States’ military in Vietnam. Air Force Captain Edwin Gerald Shank wrote numerous letters to family members about the war. The family released the letters to the *Indianapolis News*. What was printed was an epiphany as to how the government had misled the public in the early stages of the war. Shank wrote:

What gets me the most is that they won’t tell you people what we do over here. I bet you that anyone you talk to does not know that American pilots fight this war. We – me and my buddies – do everything. The Vietnamese “students” we have on board are airmen basics. The only reason they are on board is in case we crash there is one American “adviser” and one Vietnamese “student.” They’re stupid, ignorant, sacrificial lambs, and...a menace to have on board. (Hammond, 1988, p. 76)

In response, relatives of U.S. soldiers killed in South Vietnam bought a full-page ad in the *Washington Star* that listed the names of 127 Americans killed in the conflict since 1961. The ad also charged the Defense Department with concealing many other casualties. Senator Margaret Chase Smith of Maine commented in 1964 that “there is a genuine need, a desperate need, for the American people to be told the truth of the Vietnamese war. They are not getting the facts from their government” (Hammond, 1988, p. 77).

In attempts to find the truth about the United States’ role in Vietnam, many reporters filed detailed reports about troop deployments and operations. As the U.S. role

in Vietnam escalated, the Johnson administration considered formal military censorship to halt such reports. However, after many months of debates, a formal system of press censorship was rejected. For the most part, journalists had an excellent record of protecting national security. In addition, military scholars point out that some officers were uncomfortable with imposing censorship because Congress had not formally declared war. For some Congressional members, imposing censorship could turn public opinion against the administration because it ultimately violated democratic values.

Colonel Summers emphasized this opinion by stating:

Imposition of total censorship would not only jeopardize the very basis of American society but would also sever the link between the American people and their military. The ultimate price could well be higher than any advantages that might accrue through improved U.S. strategic security. (Summers, 1984, p. 255)

It is the inherent right of the news media to criticize. Early reporting in Vietnam was shrouded by questions of the government's misleading of the media and the public. And although some called for censorship, Vietnam remained an open book for reporters. It was this openness that would lead to a shift in the relationship between the media and the military. And it was the early optimistic picture the government conveyed that would ultimately cause the shift in the way the war was reported. The press showed a definitive shift from an informational source to a pessimistic, opinion-oriented democratic institution.

The Tet Offensive – The Turning Point in the Relationship

The most detrimental position taken by the United States government during the early years of Vietnam was presenting a false image that the war was going well. But

when the Viet Cong launched the Tet offensive in January 1968, the media, Congress, and the American public were taken off guard. The optimism of the Johnson administration could not prepare the nation for this attack that lasted for weeks.

The media have long been accused of reporting the Tet offensive as a victory for the North Vietnamese military. On the contrary, our forces defeated the North Vietnamese while the Viet Cong suffered heavy losses. Charles Mohr, who spent four years covering the Vietnam War for the *New York Times*, wrote in retrospect about the battle of Tet:

At 9 a.m. on January 31 the Vietnam press corps was in no position to declare a result, victory or otherwise, in the Tet offensive (we were not even calling it that yet), a complex event that was to continue for many weeks of intense combat. We had not yet had breakfast on the first day of what was to be a prolonged adventure; we had not even had a formal news briefing by Military Assistance Command Vietnam on the situation in Saigon and in South Vietnam as a whole. But by then we knew that much of Saigon was overrun by Viet Cong...No professional, serious journalist could have ignored the embassy attack. (Mohr, 1983, p. 51)

Jacqueline Sharkey points out, “What the United States did lose during Tet was the illusion, maintained continuously by the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon, that the war was going well” (Sharkey, 1991, p. 53). Clark Clifford emphasized this point further by stating that the Tet offensive “made a mockery of what the American military had told the public about the war, and devastated Administration credibility” (Clifford, 1991, p. 52). He continued by saying that it was the “size and scope” of the offensive in addition to the high number of casualties, not the news coverage, that helped turn public opinion against the war overall. However, because of the media’s pessimism, many military officials pointed to the news coverage of Tet as one of the major reasons the American public turned against the war.

Some studies concur with such conclusions of military leaders. Peter Braestrup, a former Marine and *Washington Post* bureau chief in Saigon, presented *Big Story*, a exhaustive analysis of the Tet news coverage. His study concluded that “the media over-reacted to and sensationalized the action, and conveyed a picture of American and South Vietnamese troops with their backs literally against the wall” (Wyatt, 1986, p. 105). By doing so, Braestrup concludes that the news media made a psychological defeat out of what would be considered a military victory, and contributed to the decline of popular support at home.

Herein lies one of the greatest myths to come out of the Vietnam War as a whole. Public opinion polls showed that news coverage of Tet did not deteriorate Americans’ support for the war. On the contrary, the percentage of Americans who supported the war effort actually increased after the offensive (Braestrup, 1978, p. 505). According to the Gallup organization, the number of Americans who expressed confidence in U.S. military policies in South Vietnam rose from 61% in December 1967 to 74% in February 1968.

Perhaps the greatest fallacy of the war that had the greatest impact on public opinion was the government’s ability to make the scene in Vietnam more positive. Vietnam was considered a public relations war (Sharkey, 1991). President Johnson himself based his foreign policy on controlling public opinion. Hammond states that the president’s inability to formulate a decisive course of action after Tet was a major reason why U.S. support for the war began to decline following the offensive. He wrote, “The lack of any effort by Johnson to marshal public opinion in his favor also affected the American public’s mood of aggressiveness, which likewise began to drain away” (Hammond, 1988, p. 372).

The Changing Face of News Coverage Following Tet

Walter Cronkite took a public stand against the unpopular war shortly after the Tet offensive. After experiencing the months following Tet firsthand, Cronkite proclaimed his personal, anti-administration opinion on CBS' *Evening News*. He said:

We have too often been disappointed by the optimism of the American leaders, both in Vietnam and in Washington, to have faith any longer in the silver linings they find in the darkest clouds. It seems now more than ever that the bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stalemate. (James, 1991, p. 18)

President Johnson, who was watching the newscast in the White House, reportedly turned to Press Secretary George Christian, and said, "Well, if I've lost Cronkite, I've lost Middle America" (James, 1991, p. 18).

In a later interview, Cronkite revealed:

When I went over there, I didn't know what I was going to report back, actually. I didn't go over to do a hatchet job. I didn't go over to be anti-Vietnam. I had been very disturbed over the lack of candor of the administration with the American public, about the constant misleading statements as to the prospects of victory – the light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel stuff. I thought – and still think – that was the most heinous part of the whole Vietnam adventure. (James, 1991, p. 17)

The press, along with the American people, was deceived by the government's official reports out of Vietnam. Thus, many correspondents set out to experience the war firsthand, reporting the brutal reality of the war, and not counting on official reports to fill their columns. Aware that the exhaustion of the war was spreading at home, reporters began to change the way they reported the war. Some reporters showed little sympathy for the soldiers in the field. Reports of drug abuse, interracial tensions, attacks upon officers by rebellious enlisted men, and the refusal to obey lawful orders in combat often dominated war coverage (Hammond, 1994, p. 2103). Because of such reporting, many officers had little to do with reporters, often neglecting to provide transportation to

correspondents covering combat operations. Many times, the same officers would delay the release of information until press deadlines had passed and failed to present timely press briefings to the press corps. In the eyes of the media, military credibility was at an all-time low. And in turn, mistrust of the media continued to escalate among military commanders. This mistrust by both entities would continue for the remaining years of the war and would continue to affect the overall relationship between the military and media in subsequent wars.

Conclusion

In 1987, Marine Corps Major Cass D. Howell expressed the feelings of many officers when he wrote, “The power and impact of television was *the* deciding factor in turning American public opinion from one of supporting U.S. defense of South Vietnam to one of opposing it” (Howell, 1987, p. 72). But perhaps Ted Koppel countered this argument best when he states, “People don’t need television to tell them a boy has gone to Southeast Asia and not come back” (Wyatt, 1986, p. 104).

In their studies on the media and public opinion, both Hallin and Hammond concluded that media coverage was accurate and supportive of U.S. involvement in South Vietnam. According to both scholars, when popular consensus changed toward the war, the media began portraying the situation in South Asia as serious.

Although the military would like to blame the changing of public support for the war on the press and the images it presented, scholars such as Michael Sherer, Hammond and John Mueller point out that it was the high number of casualties and confusion about the goals of the conflict that led the public to lose faith in the operations. Hammond

concluded that public opinion fell 15 points every time casualties increased by a factor of

10. In 1991, Colonel Summers stated in his testimony about Gulf War restrictions that:

...blaming the media for the loss of the Vietnam War was wrong. The media, and television in particular, is good at showing the cost of the war. But [the] cost of anything only has meaning in relation to value...It was not the news media, which reported the price, that lost the war. It was the government which, especially in the case of President Lyndon B. Johnson, deliberately failed to establish its value. (Summers, 1991, pp. 1-2).

The Vietnam War provided military personnel with a new model for information control. Although evidence rebuking the sentiments of many commanders were published in the years following Vietnam, many military officials remained strong in their conviction that the media turned the public against the war. Major Howell reemphasized this point in 1987 when he wrote:

In retrospect, it is easy to see that the unlimited and often biased reporting of the Vietnam War severely limited the military's prosecution of it by undermining public support for the cause. It is not a possibility but a probability that this will occur again should the United States go to the defense of another ally. (Howell, 1987, 77)

Such sentiment would make way for press restrictions in the next major U.S. offensive, coming nearly two decades after the end of Vietnam.

CHAPTER 4

GRENADA: UNPRECEDENTED MEDIA RESTRAINTS AND FORMATION OF THE MEDIA'S "COMPLAINT DISCOURSE"

On the morning of October 25, 1983, United States forces invaded Grenada, a small island in the Caribbean with a population of 110,000. Only days before the initial invasion, President Maurice Bishop was overthrown in a military coup and was executed. In the midst of the takeover, more than 100 of his supporters were massacred in the nation's capital of St. George. Prior to this takeover, the Reagan administration had targeted Grenada as a major Cold War concern. The coup caused the administration to see the situation as crucial. Immediately after the massacre in Grenada's capital, Reagan and his advisors assembled the largest American military operation since the Vietnam War. "Operation Urgent Fury" was planned and administered quickly.

The quick deployment of troops was administered for a central mission: 1) find and rescue the nearly 700 American medical students that studied at St. George University; 2) rescue Governor General Paul Scoons, who had been jailed by the new regime; and 3) neutralize the Grenadian People's Revolutionary Army and secure the island. By October 28, the military had achieved its goals in Grenada. In a televised speech, President Reagan told the American people that Grenada was "a Soviet-Cuban colony being readied as a major military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy... We got there just in time" (Naparstek, 1993).

Operation Urgent Fury was hardly extraordinary in terms of military achievements. For years, American forces had intervened in Latin American countries countless times. But what made the invasion different, and pertinent to American democracy, was an unofficial objective of the mission: it was the military's intention to maintain complete control over information coming in and out of the island. Therefore, unprecedented restraints were placed on the press, not allowing journalists anywhere near the island until the operation was completely over. One White House official said the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Vessey Jr. believed that, "If you get newspeople into this, you lose support of public opinion" (Maraniss, 1983, p. A2). Vessey's voice reflects many military commanders' views after Vietnam.

Peter Braestrup, like many American journalists of the time, said the actions were unprecedented and unacceptable. He wrote:

...the government's failure, at the outset, to allow an independent flow of information to the public about a major military operation was unprecedented in modern American history...In World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and lesser military engagements, civilian authorities saw to it that, in keeping with our tradition as an open society, reasonable provision was made for journalists in war zones. There was tacit agreement between the military and the media that the president, in his role as commander-in-chief, and his civilian subordinates assumed responsibility for media policy as for the war effort as a whole. Civilian authority did not defer, as it did in Grenada, to the commander in the field. (Braestrup, 1985, p. 3)

And although members of the press were furious about being completely excluded, the American people were essentially supportive of such restraints. According to Cable News Network (CNN) news director Daniel Schorr, 80 percent of the logged calls to his network supported Pentagon restrictions on the press. When CBS news placed a "censored" graphic on any reports out of Grenada, many calls came in charging the

network with being “unpatriotic” (Young, 1997, p. 133). In response to such public support, a Pentagon spokesman told a reporter, “I guess most people don’t think I have to tell you a damn thing” (Young, 1997, p. 133).

Although very short, “Operation Urgent Fury” had a profound effect on the relationship between the military and the media. The mistrust of both entities by each other propagated by the Vietnam War remained strong during the invasion. During the three days of the operation, strife between the military and the media continued, growing stronger for each day the press was excluded. Grenada became the first American military operation to ever exclude the press from coverage with the explicit goal of assuring that only “official” pictures of the combat were seen by the public. *Time* correspondent Bernard Diederich wrote an article for *Worldview* in 1984 stating, “Reality was the first casualty of the Grenada ‘war,’ and there was something strangely Orwellian about the whole affair – as if ‘1984’ had arrived early” (Diederich, 1984, p. 7).

It is necessary to understand the implications of such exclusion, both on the tumultuous relationship of the media and the military and the type of reporting permitted in subsequent wars. This chapter attempts to illustrate a concise understanding of such implications.

Explanation of Restrictions

A day after the invasion, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger affirmed that military leaders had decided to not allow journalists to witness the invasion. He stated that journalists would be allowed in Grenada “as soon as the commanders notify us that it is appropriate” (Hunter, 1983, p. A12). Members of the media and Congress were stunned at the defense secretary’s comments, thinking that such a policy had severe

implications for proponents of the U.S. Constitution. In a *New York Times* editorial, such sentiments were apparent:

What a perversion of the idea of civilian control of the military...It's not a case of accommodating a few hundred reporters or their employers. It's a case of responsibility to 235 million Americans who depend on those reporters. The public needs to know what its Government is doing, the more so when it commits troops to an expedition whose wisdom is debated so heatedly. (*The New York Times*, 1983, p. A26)

Reagan backed up Weinberger's statement, saying that reporters would be allowed in Grenada when the Defense Department decided it was safe enough. The rationale of safety was the first explanation given in regards to exclusion. But reporters argued that many correspondents worked under much more dangerous conditions in the past. Safety, to them, should not be an issue. Walter Cronkite responded by saying, "For heaven's sake, journalists have been going into unsafe places from time immemorial to get the story" (Cronkite, 1983, p. S14964). He called the media blackout a "terribly dangerous precedent, an impossible precedent."

Another explanation given to the media about press exclusion was that the operation was planned so quickly, that there was no time to set up a strategic public affairs plan. In a study conducted by Jacqueline Sharkey, many military officers said this statement was untrue (Sharkey, 1991, p. 73). However, much needs to be examined about the planning of this mission and its correlation to the exclusion of the media. Perhaps, the haphazard planning of the operation caused potential embarrassment for the Pentagon in the initial stages of the mission. Military officers did not know the location of many of the medical students they were sent to save. U.S. troops were confused about who the actual enemy was and were supplied with tourist maps instead of strategic military maps.

And when U.S. forces accidentally bombed a mental hospital, more than a dozen innocent people were killed. And so, in the big scheme of things, perhaps the government did not want the media to have access to such blunders. By excluding the media, the government attempted to hide impending problems that resulted from a quickly planned mission.

But perhaps the most honest rendition of the Pentagon's decision to exclude the media came from the Joint Task Force Commander for the Grenada Operation, Vice Admiral Joseph W. Metcalf, who told reporters, "I'm down here to take an island. I don't need you running around and getting in the way" (Sharkey, 1991, p. 73).

Restrictions are Tested

Reporters trying to reach the island during the press blackout soon learned the seriousness of the ban. ABC correspondent Josh Mankiewicz had hired a fishing boat to reach the island, but quickly turned back when a U.S. destroyer cut across the boat's bow. Two other ABC staffers, Steve Shepard and Tim Ross, hired another boat, but were forced back by a Navy plane. Ross recounted:

The Navy jet came over and made a couple of runs at us...First it just wagged its wings. Then it made a lateral pass. Finally, it opened the bomb doors, and the pilot dropped a buoy about 30 feet ahead of us just to show what else he could drop and how close he could drop it. (Sharkey, 1991, p. 73)

A CBS correspondent chartered a plane in Barbados, a nearby island, and taped some aerial shots of Grenada and naval activity before a U.S. jet chased off his plane (Castro, 1983, p. 65).

Four journalists who did reach the island – Edward Cody of the *Washington Post*, Don Bohning of the *Miami Herald*, Morris Thompson of *Newsday* and a British reporter

– were met by Grenadian troops at the shore. They were escorted to a nearby fire station and were held *in communicado* by Admiral Metcalf. Anticipating U.S. intervention, the four reporters originally left Barbados the day before the invasion, arriving about 7 _ hours after the operation had begun. While detained, the correspondents listened to radio reports that the war was over. Diederich would later write:

...nothing the radio reported matched what was happening on the ground. As we sat literally on Fort Rupert's doorstep, Radio Trinidad broadcast a war communique from U.S. sources describing how U.S. Marines were storming the fort, although only lizards were stirring on the ancient battlements before us. (Diederich, 1984, p. 7)

The reporters were later moved to a hotel where they attempted to file their reports. All phone lines were dead, hindering any firsthand accounts of the ensuing action.

In a letter sent by CBS president Edward Joyce to Weinberger, strong convictions about the imposed exclusion and censorship of the news media were reiterated. The letter stated:

I wish to protest in the strongest possible terms the position of the Defense Department in restricting CBS News' access to the island of Grenada.

I would also like to protest the attitude expressed by your Public Affairs offices as indicated in the statements of Colonel Robert O'Brien and Lt. Colonel Leon DeLorme today to our correspondent Bill Lynch that "we learned a lesson from the British in the Falklands." To use the censorship by the British as an example to be followed by the United States in this military operation is baffling to me and deeply disturbing because it refutes the principles of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. (E. Joyce, letter, 1983)

The government and military officials stayed steadfast in their plan. The media were not allowed on the island until the operation was over.

"Cleared by Defense Department Censors"

What the media and the public did receive were “official” images presented by the United States military. Early video footage showed weapons found on the island and Cuban prisoners. Much of the Pentagon video showed no combat and what *Washington Post* TV critic Tom Shales characterized as “American students smiling, blowing kisses and flashing the ‘V’ sign as they were escorted off the island under military protection” (Shales, 1983, p. B1). But these were the only images available to news organizations, and they were used in both print and broadcast media. However, using the images was definitely scrutinized by the networks. Footage aired by CBS News was superimposed with the words “Cleared by Defense Dept. Censors.” NBC’s Tom Brokaw introduced video by warning viewers that the Reagan administration had “tightly controlled” news coverage of Grenada. CBS’ Dan Rather warned the audience that the footage had been “shot by the Army and censored by the Army” (Shales, 1983, p. B1).

The Public Reacts

What was most detrimental to the media’s cause for more access was that the public, the main entity that the press claims to serve, did not show strong support for the media’s battle against press restrictions. Citing several polls conducted during this period, Combelles-Sigel stated that 52 % of respondents approved of the limitations on press access to Grenada; 64 % believed the explanations given by the Reagan administration for excluding the press and only 25 % believed press restrictions occurred because the administration wanted to manipulate the public; and 47 % approved of excluding the press until the mission was complete (Combelles-Siegel, 1996, p. 3). When editors of *Editor and Publisher* surveyed a dozen daily newspapers, they found letters to the editor

running 3 to 1 in favor of press restrictions. *Time* received 225 letters which favored the restrictions 8 to 1 (Henry, 1983, p. 76).

“Operation Urgent Fury” did not only cause strife between the media and the military. It appeared that the development of a major division had occurred between the press and the public as well. The public had questioned the morality of the press corps for some time. But just days before the Grenada invasion, 241 U.S. servicemen were killed in the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut. Americans at home watched reporters and cameras pry into the lives of the families who had lost loved ones; quintessentially putting the question of morality into play again. In essence, the shift in the public’s perception of the press was caused by sensational writing and by photographs that marked this period of journalism (Sharkey, 1991; Naparstek, 1993) Perhaps the public did not want this type of press to cover the events in Grenada. In fact, once the press was allowed access to the island, a major news magazine published a graphic photograph of a young Marine helicopter pilot lying dead on the beach. The public was not ready to see this type of image and was readily in support of press restrictions governed by the Reagan administration.

The Media Seeks Revisions of Restrictions

After some initial criticism of the press ban, many members in Congress became silent when it was apparent that Reagan’s decision to invade Grenada was popular with the people. A House subcommittee held hearings on such restrictions as part of a series of hearings on national security and civil liberties. Some media executives were asked to submit written and oral testimony that warned of the implications of future press bans. CBS President Edward Joyce wrote:

I am seriously concerned that we may indeed be witnessing the dawn of a new era of censorship, of manipulation of the press, of considering the media the handmaiden of government to spoon feed the public with government-approved information...I am concerned that such action will be taken again and again, whenever a government wishes to keep the public in the dark. (Joyce, 1983, p. 11)

By mid-November 1983, many media groups were looking to challenge the constitutionality of the press ban in Grenada. Larry Flynt, publisher of *Hustler* magazine, was the first to file a lawsuit. Jack Landau, Executive Director of the Reporter's Committee for Freedom of the Press, led another group in a lawsuit. The committee conducted a survey of all U.S. military engagements from 1754-1983 and concluded that reporters could not be legally excluded from a war.

In response to such lawsuits, the Pentagon asked retired Army Major General Sidle to prepare a report that would set precedence for a new media-military relationship. Released on August 23, 1984, the Sidle Report was "accepted" by media executives and the Pentagon. The report stated:

The American people must be informed about United States military operations and this information can best be provided through both the news media and the Government. Therefore, the panel believes it is essential that the U.S. news media cover U.S. military operations to the maximum degree possible consistent with mission security and safety of U.S. forces. (Sidle, 1984, p. 3)

The report promised to implement various recommendations, including to initiate public affairs and operational planning both simultaneously, to rely on voluntary ground rules, to provide more transportation and communication facilities for media efforts, to schedule meetings between military and media representatives, and to provide additional public affairs training for military personnel.

In addition to the above recommendations, the Sidle Report implemented the establishment of a national media pool. This became the most controversial elements of the Sidle Report and would be tested and scrutinized intensely in subsequent wars. Pool coverage involves the combined resources of several media outlets to report on any conflict. The Pentagon basically chooses members of the National Media Pool by a lottery. Pool reporters, usually made of 11 members from different media outlets, write accounts of the activities they view during the combat and share that information with other members outside the immediate pool. The implementation of this pool system would be tested extensively just five years after Grenada, when “Operation Just Cause” erupted in Panama.

Conclusion

The American press was excluded from the military operation in Grenada to an extent unprecedented in our nation’s history. This exclusion, stemming from the mistrust of the media at the conclusion of Vietnam, held unparalleled ramifications in the relationship between the military and the media. And although members of the media argued that restrictions limited the view of the battle from the American people, the public backed the government’s decision of exclusion. Roger Pinus wrote, “The Grenadian press exclusion gave rise to more rancor between government and the news media than any event since the Pentagon Papers. Despite the recommendations of the Sidle Report, tensions persist, and future conflicts and recriminations many be inevitable” (Pincus, 1997, p. 850).

Perhaps more than anything else, the conflict in Grenada clearly presented the conflict between both the military and the media, and the media and the public. After the

conflict, however, it was apparent that changes were inevitably needed in attempts to mend both sets of relationships. “Operation Just Cause” in Panama would be the test of the relationship and the new implementations set forth by the Sidle Report.

CHAPTER 5

THE INVASION OF PANAMA: A TEST OF THE SIDLE REPORT

After the invasion of Grenada, and the ensuing press restrictions that followed, the complaint discourse of the media became strong. The complaints deserved merit because it was the first time such press restrictions were inflicted upon the media. In subsequent years, the discourse strengthened, and media professionals needed a true test of the Sidle Report.

When General Manuel Noriega took control of the Panamanian government in 1983, U.S. officials were delighted. As records show, Noriega had worked for the United States as an intelligence resource since 1958 (*United States v. Manuel Antonio Noriega, et al.*, 1991). But in 1988, when two grand juries in Florida handed down drug trafficking and money laundering indictments against Noriega, conflict between the United States and the Panamanian government escalated. The situation reached an high point during 1989 when street violence erupted in response to the presidential election, when Noriega's hand-picked candidate, Carlos Duque, apparently lost the election to Guillermo Endara by a margin of more than 2-to-1. Noriega had the election nullified and installed another associate, Francisco Rodriguez, as head of the provisional government. The Bush administration, seeing an invasion as eminent, began preparations. Among these preparations, the Bush administration planned how the media coverage should be handled.

In mid-December 1989, one U.S. officer was killed and a Panamanian soldier was wounded in connection with altercations between Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) and U.S. soldiers in the streets of Panama City. Noreiga said that the conditions resembled a state of war with the United States. On December 20, 1989, U.S. military forces launched a massive land, sea, and air invasion of Panama. “Operation Just Cause” was the first major military operation since Grenada, and the largest operation since Vietnam. Panama was also the first military operation to test the press pool system implemented by the Sidle Panel. William Kennedy wrote:

What is most striking about the behavior of the press...throughout the early pool deployments and the Panama invasion is that it looked solely and entirely to the government for a solution to its problems of wartime coverage. It was the government that must devise a system by which the press could get to the scene of action. It was the government that must make all of the physical arrangements. It was the government that must provide the information that would enable pool members to understand what the deployment was all about and the nature of the troops they would be accompanying and to arrange upon arrival for explanations of what was going on, weapons being used, and so on. (Kennedy, 1993, p. 116)

But what became apparent during the early stages of the operation in Panama was that the pool system was not implemented properly, causing much strife among the military and the media.

Mistakes are Made in Informing the Media

Initially, it appeared that the military had learned a valuable lesson from the events in Grenada. On November 13, 1989, over a month before the beginning of “Operation Just Cause,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked the public affairs office of the U.S. Southern Command (SouthCom) to draft a plan for dealing with the media in case of an invasion. SouthCom assumed that a pool of reporters already in Panama would perform the initial reporting of the incident, thus not needing a pool from Washington,

D.C. Because of a lack of communication, the decision of whether the pool should be created from reporters in Washington and Panama was delayed until only five and a half hours before the invasion began. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney decided to use the Washington press pool because “we were accustomed to it” and pool members “knew the ground rules” (Sharkey, 1991, p. 93). Like Grenada, secrecy was paramount to the success of the mission. And Cheney was afraid that if the press pool was deployed too soon, security breeches would be eminent. Therefore, as of December 19, no equipment, transportation, or provisions were established for journalists when the actual invasion occurred. So, even if the pool had been activated in a timely manner, it would be poorly supported once it arrived in Panama. Pete Williams, the Defense Department’s Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs, began notifying pool members at 7:30 p.m. on December 19. As the invasion began, reporters were en route from Washington, D.C. to Panama and did not arrive until more than four hours after the initial start of the operation.

The pool was made up of four photographers, six print correspondents, one radio reporter, and an NBC television reporter. Lack of planning, however, deterred initial reporting of the operation. Once they arrived in Panama, there was no transportation available. Instead, the reporters were sent to a holding room where they watched a Bush news conference on television. While awaiting transportation, the pool correspondents were allowed to report on events on the base at which they were being held. Such hindrances were signs of what was to come for the pool reporters. Fred Hoffman, former newsman and Pentagon official, wrote:

Excessive concern for secrecy prevented timely detailed planning for the pool’s coverage of Operation Just Cause. A lack of helicopters – which could have been avoided with proper planning – prevented the pool from reporting much of what

was left of the action by the time the pool reached Panama. Some U.S. military concern in Panama for the safety of the pool members impeded coverage...The result of all of this was that the 16-member pool produced stories and pictures of essentially secondary value. (Hoffman, 1991, p. 92)

Once the pool was allowed in the field, many military commanders had not been briefed about the journalists' arrival and refused to talk to them. Some commanders even said they were told not to talk to journalists. In addition, reporters were not allowed to talk with wounded soldiers, and photographers were told to not take pictures of downed helicopters or the closed caskets of U.S. soldiers who had died in combat (Hoffman, 1990, p. 11).

Once the pool reporters returned to media headquarters, they found it very difficult to transmit copy. The Pentagon fax machine that was suppose to receive the copy and send it to other news organizations malfunctioned. Calls to the media center were misdirected to another office or the phones simply went unanswered. Hours passed before reporters knew they had to resend their copy (Hoffman, 1990, p. 14).

Photographers, too, had a difficult time in reporting back to the States. Transmission of pictures over phone lines was interrupted as Panamanian operators continually broke the lines. According to Reuters photographer Tim Aubrey, it took 10 hours to send six to eight photos when it should have taken less than two hours (Hoffman, 1990, p. 14).

Vietnam Revisited: Misinforming the Press

Physical and technical obstacles, like the ones mentioned above, deterred complete reporting from Panama. But perhaps the most detrimental aspect of reporting the Panama invasion was the misinforming of the press pools during U.S. briefings in

Panama and Washington. These briefings, as reports later show, gave a false, optimistic view of events, concealing many military mistakes and casualties (Hoffman, 1991; Sharkey, 1991).

For example, during the first days of the invasion, the Pentagon insisted that no U.S. troops had been killed or wounded by friendly fire. Yet, six months after the invasion, *Newsweek* ran an investigative article that revealed friendly fire had killed or wounded more than a dozen troops in action. The ensuing dialogue at a June 19 Pentagon briefing charged the Defense Department with concealing the casualties during the actual invasion. A reporter asked if the Secretary of Defense knew of the casualties, whereas Department of Defense spokesman Pete Williams replied, “The Secretary, the Chairman and the President all knew.” When the reporter asked, “How come we didn’t,” Williams answered, “That’s a good question. I’m not sure that I totally know the answer to that one, but obviously we need to do better” (Defense Department Briefing, June 19, 1990, p. 2).

But misguiding did not stop here. During Pentagon briefings through much of 1990, U.S. spokesmen estimated that 202 civilians and 314 military personnel had died through the duration of the invasion. However, several human rights organizations reported that civilian deaths had been underestimated, while military deaths were overestimated (Cousins, 1990; Hockstrader, 1990; Rohter, 1990). In fact, the reports said more civilians were killed than military personnel. Some allegations arose that many civilians had been buried in unmarked mass graves. SouthCom issued a fact sheet in December 1990 that would explain the body count. According to the report, Panama’s coroner’s office had identified 65 military and 157 civilian remains. Thus, what some

human rights groups were arguing was essentially true. More civilians died in Panama than military personnel. The fact sheet rebuts any claims of unmarked graves, however. The report concludes that issues pertaining to a complete body count “may ultimately escape complete resolution” (United States Southern Command, 1990, p. 5).

As another example of misleading, two days after the invasion had begun, U.S. officials took reporters to one of the residences of Noreiga while he was still at large. As military personnel opened the freezer of the residence, they found plastic bags full of a white, powdery substance that was revealed as cocaine. Pentagon briefer, Lieutenant General Kelly, said the cocaine weighed 50 kilograms (Defense Department Briefing, December 22, 1989). Reports surfaced, however, that the substance was not cocaine. In fact, speaking on conditions of anonymity, several Pentagon sources told reporters that the substance was used in voodoo rituals, and was designed to cast a spell on Bush and members of Congress (Meddis, 1990, p. A4). After going back and forth about the legitimacy of the story, Williams finally admitted that the substance was not cocaine, but ingredients used to make tamales. And although Pentagon officials insisted that no attempt was made to mislead the press, it had never corrected the mistake until pressured by the media (Sharkey, 1991).

Tired of being misled by the military, CNN aired a telephone number that residents of Panama could call to report what was happening around them (Warren, 1989, p. A16). CNN received hundreds of calls, providing vivid and revealing descriptions of what was going on. Residents described civilians running to escape gunfire. Such descriptions contrasted the Pentagon’s assumptions of a well-organized operation planned to minimize damage to neighborhoods. It also showed Pentagon officials what

would occur if cameras were allowed to capture the action first-hand. CNN executive Ed Turner would later say in an interview, “The White House and Pentagon were on TV insisting that we’d won, that everything was under control, and we were just mopping up. But viewers in Panama would call to say that the fighting was going on in their front yard by rose bushes” (Richmond, 1989, p. A12).

The bulk of deaths occurred on the first night of the invasion. Although the American media were unable to witness the onslaught of the invasion, many Panamanians came forward with vivid descriptions of that first night. One resident of El Chorillo described American soldiers “entering each house. We saw the people – the residents – coming out, followed by the soldiers, and then we saw the houses, one by one, go up in smoke. The U.S. soldiers were burning the houses” (as cited in Naparsek, 1993). No one will ever really know what happened in the small town of El Chorillo that night. However, if the media had been allowed to accompany troops to the town during the beginning of the invasion, suspicions would have either been confirmed or resolved.

Frustrated at the situation and limited access, pool reporters coined two self-proclaimed mottoes: “Semper Tardis” (“Always Late”), and “If it’s news today, it’s news to us” (Boot, 1990, p. 18). One member of the pool, Kevin Merida of the *Dallas Morning News*, articulated the frustration of limited access even further:

The military seemed to have no concept of what our role was. The whole first day was devoted to taking us to places where the action was already over. It was like forming a White House pool and then showing them an empty hall saying, “This is where the president spoke.” (as cited in Naparsek, 1993)

The Bray Incident Calls for New Stipulations

On January 2, 1990, a story by correspondent Peter Copeland appeared in the *Washington Times* reporting that Captain Linda Bray and her unit encountered 40 “heavily armed troops” when they tried to secure a facility in Panama City. In addition, the unit found three enemy soldiers dead there (Copeland, 1990, p. A1). The story created a media frenzy, and members of the press insisted that more information about the mission be made available.

According to SouthCom’s after-action report, parts of Copeland’s story were not accurate. The unit did not find dead bodies and Bray herself did not know how many enemy troops they had encountered. According to Copeland, he based the story on an interview he had conducted with Bray shortly after the mission. But Bray could not recall speaking specifically with Copeland. Bray did admit, however, that Copeland could have received misinformation from other members within her unit.

The controversy resulted in further recommendations regarding the way future conflicts should be reported. Because of conflicting stories in the Bray incident, SouthCom’s after-action report stated that escorts should be present during all media interviews with military personnel. The report said, “An interview should not be conducted without going through the proper PA [public affairs] channels, i.e., the Media Center, and without a PA representative present” (as cited in Sharkey, 1991, p. 104).

Such stipulations stemmed from the question of accuracy. To obtain the highest level of accuracy in reporting on conflicts, the Pentagon and White House agreed that military escorts were the answer. Air Force public affairs policies reiterate such sentiments:

Because the news media must be selective in their coverage, and often assume the role of government's skeptical observer or adversary, they may filter information in ways which cause imbalance or inaccuracies. Nevertheless, Air Force media relations programs must be open and responsive within the bounds of national security, not withholding information simply because it is embarrassing to the Air Force. (as cited in Sharkey, 1991, p. 104)

The Bray incident reinforced the perception that an escort system was necessary in regards to media relations. This system would be implemented during the Gulf War, just one year later.

Conclusion

The invasion of Panama proved to be the first true test of the Sidle Report established only five years prior. For journalists, the test ended in failure. The pool was deployed too late to cover the onslaught of the war. Misleadings by military leaders and the White House caused the credibility of the military to be questioned and challenged again. New stipulations between the military and the media arose. The Hoffman Report, along with SouthCom's after-action report, focused on problems caused not by the media, but by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

The Hoffman report was the more critical of the two post-Panama reports. The report refuted the Defense Department's concern for secrecy as the excuse for late deployment of the national press pool. The report stressed that during previous pool deployments, "hundreds of newsmen and newswomen demonstrated that they could be trusted to respect essential ground rules, including operational security." In addition, the military's claim that the pool was not deployed sooner due to safety concerns for the members of the press was also scrutinized by the Hoffman Report. According to the

report, safety considerations “should not have been allowed to limit the pool’s reporting opportunities. Newsmen and women cover wars at their own risk” (Hoffman, 1990, p. 1).

The Hoffman report concluded with 17 essential recommendations that included additional public affairs planning; better transportation and communication facilities for pool operations; and a detailed policy from the Secretary of Defense in support for the DOD national media pool and his contention that other Pentagon officials support it.

The opportunity to implement such recommendations occurred much sooner than initially anticipated. Less than seven months later, the Pentagon would revisit these recommendations as “Operation Desert Shield” commenced in the Persian Gulf.

CHAPTER 6

THE GULF WAR:

REVISITING TURMOIL BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND MEDIA

Just seven months after the termination of Operation Just Cause, President Bush ordered the deployment of U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia for what would be termed Operation Desert Shield. Emphasis was placed on the U.S.'s role in the Gulf as primarily defensive. In a propagandistic way, Bush compared Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait with the Nazi blitzkrieg in Europe during the 1930s, and Hussein himself with Adolf Hitler. Bush's famous metaphor warning that a "line has been drawn in the sand" signaled that anything less than an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait was unacceptable. (Bush, 1990, p. 1-2). In regards to the president's decision to deploy troops, public opinion polls illustrated a strong initial support for Bush's actions. In fact, a *New York Times* poll indicated 74 percent of Americans approved of his decision (Oreskes, 1990, p. 13).

This was the beginning of what would be the largest U.S. offensive since Vietnam and the first major long-term conflict fought since Vietnam. Regardless, not a single journalist accompanied American troops when they were deployed to Saudi Arabia. The activation of the national press pool was once again ignored, and individual journalists were not able to obtain Saudi visas. Michael Wines, a correspondent for the *New York Times*, wrote, "For the second time in eight months, American troops today headed into a foreign military operation without the special contingent of reporters and photographers

that the Pentagon has pledged to summon when the United States forces are sent abroad” (Wines, 1990, p. A14).

President Bush defended the decision to not deploy the national media pool because, according to him, “there’s plenty of reporters in Saudi Arabia.” This assumption, however, was incorrect. In fact, not a single American reporter was present in Saudi Arabia due in part because the country had historically controlled its press and had not allowed Western journalists to spend much time there.

Struggles between the press and military would continue throughout the war in the Gulf. Just as in previous wars, questions of First Amendment suppression would dominate the media’s coverage of the war. William Kennedy wrote:

During the months leading up to the Persian Gulf War...and throughout the war itself the U.S. government succeeded, for the first time in U.S. history, in controlling almost totally what the public would be permitted to know about the conduct of military operations. That happened not because government is as yet all-powerful, but because a smug, arrogant, and self-righteous press was operating twentieth- and twenty-first-century technology with nineteenth-century concepts of organization, training and management. (Kennedy, 1993, p. x)

So with the inception of the Persian Gulf conflict came immediate questions of suppression of the media once again. And as satellite technology broadened and became more widely used by news organizations, the military’s fear of security leaks heightened. This would ultimately make access to the battlefield even more difficult for reporters and contribute to the media’s overall negative view of the military.

Just as in any war, public opinion played an enormous role in the deployment of the media to cover the conflict. Public opinion polls illustrated the public’s vision of not wanting to see the nation drawn into a lengthy war like it was in Vietnam. In a *New York Times* poll, 4 in 10 respondents believed that Bush did not clearly explain why U.S.

troops had been deployed to Saudi Arabia (Oreskes, 1990, p. 13). Accordingly, *New York Times* Executive Editor Max Frankel stated, “A major military exercise cannot succeed without sustained support and understanding of the American people, and it will not long be supported or understood without extensive and close-up news reporting” (Jones, 1990, p. A10).

Operation Desert Shield

Five days after the initial troop deployment, the Department of Defense acquired visas for 17 members of the national press pool. Initially, members of the press pool praised the access and cooperation they received. Navy Captain Mike Sherman accompanied the media pool while they were in Saudi Arabia. The only specific guidance he was given by the Defense Department was to “take the news media out and show them what we’re doing” (Sharkey, 1991, p. 110).

Pool reporters proved they were sensitive to operational security. When they arrived in the Gulf, journalists learned that the U.S. had not sent enough troops to withstand an Iraqi attack. The correspondents never reported this information. In a speech presented to the National Press Club, CNN correspondent Carl Rochelle, a member of the press pool, said:

I think you’ve heard General Schwarzkopf talk about how grateful he was that we didn’t reveal how minimal the U.S. presence was in the early days. That was part of the restrictions that we had accepted as being able to cover what was going on in that area. (Rochelle, 1991, p. 6)

This would become an important epiphany for the military. The press proved that they would withhold information if correspondents deemed it detrimental to the mission. They

proved that they understood the responsibility the press had to the military, as well as the public.

After more than 300 U.S. and foreign journalists arrived in Saudi Arabia on August 26, 1990, the DOD national press pool was disbanded. The Pentagon's newly established Joint Information Bureau (JIB) began establishing procedures for unilateral news coverage. One job of the JIB was to arrange interviews and excursions for journalists deployed to the region. Journalists would submit story requests to the JIB public affairs officers, who would arrange the details. Because transportation and military escorts were limited, journalists were taken to the field in groups. Unlike the pool system, however, correspondents would write their story for their own news organization.

Although initial operations in the Gulf were more accessible than previous operations, restrictions were still in place on the media. Because field commanders did not want dozens of reporters and photographers to take up too much of their units' time, journalists were told not to visit military units on their own. In addition, the JIB was overwhelmed by thousands of story requests from reporters. However, due to limited transportation, many requests went unanswered. Such limitations led to numerous complaints, resulting in many journalists not signing the ground-rules agreement. Such journalists decided to get stories on their own, often compromising security. Such problems once again led to the military's doubt of media credibility.

Complaints by journalists did not subside with transportation issues. Pentagon officials closely monitored Desert Shield news coverage. Reporters were warned that if they asked hard questions, they would be perceived as "anti-military" by military personnel (Sharkey, 1991). In addition, journalists who wrote critical stories would

jeopardize future requests for interviews with field commanders (Sharkey, 1991, p. 111). Some journalists also complained that military escorts were advising military personnel not to answer certain types of questions in interviews. John Fialka wrote about this control of information:

General Schwarzkopf gave many interviews during the war. He often used the opportunity as another lever of control over the media, which he watched with an ever-vigilant eye. Reporters whose stories he liked got interviews. Those stories that didn't pass muster with the general often found the opportunity postponed, sometimes indefinitely. (Fialka, 1992, p. 33)

But while complaints about lack of transportation, escorts and biased information by reporters were evident, Pentagon officials were authorizing the Military Airlift Command (MAC) to fly journalists from small- and medium-sized print and broadcast operations to the Gulf. This program, aptly called the Hometown Program, was based on a successful effort conducted during the Vietnam War. As a stronger military presence was active in the Gulf Region, the DOD felt it was imperative to keep the public well-informed about the events. Thus, the Hometown Program was needed to fulfill such a goal.

However, reporters from networks and large print organizations were furious at such a program. According to them, the smaller news organizations were receiving better access to units than correspondents already stationed there. The program was eventually phased out on January 6, 1991, shortly before Operation Desert Storm began. The Pentagon turned its attention to the influx of journalists who were arriving to cover the ensuing war.

The Imminence of War: The Battle for Press Rights Continues

Bush's approval rating declined more than 20 points throughout September and October of 1990. Support for his decision to deploy more troops to the Middle East declined as well from both the American public and members of Congress. Despite his critics, Bush announced the deployment of even more troops to Saudi Arabia in order to "prepare for a possible offensive option" ("Bush: State of Kuwait", 1990, p. A33). on October 8, 1990. This was the first time Bush had alluded to possible war in the Gulf, drawing mixed reactions from Congress and the public. To neutralize declining public support, the White House began a campaign to convince the American public that the offensive would be necessary to preserve U.S. interests in the Middle East.

In December, Washington news executives were sent a memorandum that included a draft of proposed pool procedures and media ground rules that would be implemented if a war was imminent.

According to the memo, the pool procedures would be executed in three phases. Phase I, which began immediately, would involve two pools formed from media personnel already in Saudi Arabia. These pools would be sent out once every two weeks so correspondents could familiarize themselves with troops and equipment, and exercise their ability to file reports in the field. Phase II would include deploying the two pools when war was forthcoming. The idea was for the pools to be in place to cover the first stages of war. If it were not possible to move the pools into the field immediately, they would be moved as soon as conditions seemed appropriate. Additional pools would be deployed as soon as possible to expand coverage of the offensive. Phase III would begin "when open coverage is possible and would provide unilateral coverage of activities. The

pools would be disbanded and all media would operate independently, although under U.S. Central Command escort” (as cited in Sharkey, 1991, p. 118).

In addition to outlining the three phases of media pool deployment, the memo also outlined ground rules for the media. According to these stipulations, all interviews with members of the military would be on the record, in essence prohibiting reporters from conducting background interviews with military personnel. In addition, journalists had to remain with their military escorts at all times. The ground rules also explained what type of information could not be released, including information about future operations, activities against hostile targets, and information about postponed or canceled operations.

Media executives adamantly objected to the ground rules set forth by the Pentagon memo. Knight-Ridder Washington Bureau Chief Clark Hoyt stated in a letter to Pete Williams:

The proposed rules far overstep the common-sense bounds necessary to protect the security of U.S. military operations. The specific rules about what is “releasable” and “not releasable” are at once so broad and so vague that they are bound to lead to disagreement and misinterpretation even now, in advance of war. On the field, under combat conditions, the potential for misunderstanding and inconsistent interpretation is enormous. (C. Hoyt, letter, December 18, 1990)

Hoyt’s criticism was reiterated by other media executives. Focus on the requirement of media escorts spawned angry criticism as well. *The Washington Post*’s Michael Getler deemed the idea as “simply another means of controlling everything” (M. Getler, letter, December 18, 1990).

The proposed security reviews were also scrutinized by media executives. Charles J. Lewis, Hearst Newspapers Washington Bureau Chief, stated that such reviews went

beyond the provisions set forth by the Sidle Report and would become the design for the Pentagon's wartime media policies:

I'm sorry to see on-site "security review" in your plans. As you know, when the national Pentagon pool was first launched in 1984, no such reviews were contemplated. Correspondents were to comply with the "Vietnam-era rules," which didn't require prior review... Those rules won a very high degree of compliance.

Unfortunately, the practice of prior censorship has become embedded in the Pentagon pool concept in recent years, mainly because all parties quickly recognized that the pool was reliant on military communications. (C. Lewis, letter, December 20, 1990)

Because of such criticism, the military revised the proposed rules set on the media. The revisions no longer told reporters what could and could not be printed. Security reviews, however, were still intact. But if a reporter disagreed with a military escort's decision to change parts of a story, the material could be sent to the director of the JIB for review. This review process caused media executives to once again criticize the Pentagon's proposed rules. Getler believed that if this review system was put in place:

...it will cause a nightmare for us and, ultimately, for you and the American public. It will inevitably, from day one of hostilities, involve grim fights between reporters and PAOs [public affairs officers]. It will involve missed deadlines on stories that had no right to be withheld or delayed. It will poison the atmosphere between the press and the Pentagon and erode credibility to the point where there will be widespread mistrust of the information that is put out in Washington or Riyadh by the Defense Department. (M. Getler, letter, January 8, 1991)

As a result of such criticism, Pentagon officials revised the guidelines once again. The new revisions made the escort provisions less restrictive. The new guidelines also gave more details about what escorts would be looking for in security reviews. The appeals process was also changed. Disagreements about a pool report would be sent to the JIB director immediately. If no agreement was reached, the material would

immediately be sent to Washington for review by Williams and the appropriate bureau chief. Finally, the revised stipulations said that “the ultimate decision on publication will be made by the originating reporter’s news organization.”

Only a day after the final revisions were made, more than 70 journalists in eight pools were sent into the field. On January 16, 1991, U.S. and coalition aircraft began the first air attacks against Iraqi forces. And many of the pool reporters who witnessed this action were pleased with how the system for reviewing stories operated that night.

Technology Promotes the Media’s Influence During Operation Desert Storm

Technology took center stage in the Gulf War, televising war coverage around the clock. According to Nathaniel Lande:

If the American military had bogged down in the rice paddies and jungles of Vietnam, in the sands of Arabia it functioned smoothly. On television back home, the war resembled nothing so much as a giant video game, complete with instant replay. (Lande, 1998, p. 352)

Americans scrambled to their televisions to keep up-to-date with the latest news from the Gulf. No other war could match the immediacy in which events during Operation Desert Storm reached the American homes. Walter Gantz wrote, “If Vietnam was the first television war, Operation Desert Storm was the first brought home by satellite, sometimes live and in living color” (Gantz, 1993, p. 1). The use of satellites was prevalent in reporting the events of the war in the Gulf. And it was perhaps this aspect of reporting during the conflict that frightened top-ranking military officials (Gantz, 1993). Military censors would eventually refuse journalists access to the action. But technology often prevailed.

The Cable News Network (CNN) had become the key informational source during the war in the Gulf. About 250 American television stations affiliated with the cable network aired the feed provided by CNN throughout the war. In a poll conducted by Times Mirror, 61% of the respondents rated CNN as having done the best job in covering the war (Gannett Foundation, 1991, p. 88). Roughly 60% of U.S. households had cable access in the homes, with the average cable franchise offering 36 channels of basic services, including CNN (Gantz, 1993, p. 8).

But CNN's influence did not stop in America. Government officials across many countries around the world noted that CNN served as an updated source of information for them. It was even believed that Hussein relied on CNN and its international presence to plan strategic moves of his military force. During the war, CNN was available in 105 countries. The evolution of media technology transformed CNN into a worldwide presence. Navy Lieutenant Walker said:

I know for a fact that CNN was on 24 hours a day in the command center of CENTCOM in Riyadh and in the national military command center here in the Pentagon, and I'll bet it was on 24 hours a day in Baghdad as well. We used CNN for intelligence and if the Iraqis can sit there and fire off a SCUD and watch it ten minutes later...they know what they were aiming at and they know what they saw on CNN. They could therefore adjust and try to hit it the next day. (Baroody, 1998, p. 191)

Top military officials confirmed CNN's powerful presence in strategy and often scrutinized the network, calling it the "Saddam Network News" (Kalb, 1994, p. 5) or referring to the war as "The CNN War" (Laurence, 1991, p. A12).

As the war continued, people all over the world tuned to CNN for daily reports and briefings. CNN had an 11.7 primetime rating January 17-21, 1991, higher than any of the major networks' ratings and better than 10 times CNN's normal ratings. CNN was

thrust into an international sphere of influence, much to the dissatisfaction of American military personnel.

Guidelines Create Controversy

The final guidelines created by the military, although basically working in the beginning, became a strong force of animosity between the military and the media. Communications problems persisted, causing reporters' stories to take days to reach the joint information bureaus in both Ridayh and Dharman. Some stories never arrived.

But, controversies regarding military escorts and security reviews plagued the relationship even further. In the final revisions sent to news organizations prior to the war, escorts were not suppose to interfere with the news-gathering efforts of journalists. When the escorts conducted security reviews of copy, they were to look for possible violations of the ground rules (Sharkey, 1991). But despite the written guidelines, many journalists complained that a number of escorts did not follow the rules. And as the war progressed, some military personnel attempted to restrict pool members' access if they, or other officers, did not approve of a reporter's previous stories.

But above all, the military escorts' interference with news-gathering caused the most strife between the military and the media during the crisis. In a letter sent to Defense Secretary Cheney, 17 top-level news executives and editors addressed this issue, saying that some escorts "saw their duty not as facilitating but controlling." The letter stated:

The interference had nothing to do with operational security. It had everything to do with sanitizing the nature of war and polishing the image of the military.

These experiences – shared by every type of news medium, with every service and in every part of the war theater – make it clear that we cannot again be

subjected to a system that requires all newsgathering to be under the control of military monitors. (News Executives, letter, June 24, 1991)

So once again, the reporters claimed that military escorts and security reviews violated their First Amendment rights. Some journalists compared the restrictions placed on them to those placed on the press in Iraq. Associated Press Executive Editor Al Rossiter Jr. wrote:

U.S. officials correctly pointed out that the movements and reports of Western journalists in Baghdad are tightly controlled by the Iraqi government...But I suggest the same thing is happening to Western journalists attempting to cover the war from Saudi Arabia. UPI reporters in Saudi Arabia are permitted to see only what you and public affairs officers of the various services and those of the alliance want us to see. We do not have free access to the various military units and current pool arrangements are highly restrictive. (A. Rossiter, letter, February 14, 1991)

Such criticism did not change policies. In fact, more restrictions were placed on the media. Five days after the war had begun, Williams barred the media from covering the arrival of casualties at Dover Air Force Base. Williams later told a National Press Club audience:

There is an idea somehow that we're trying to sort of pretend like people don't get killed in a war, and that we do that by not allowing coverage at Dover, which, of course, is ludicrous...There really wasn't anything happening at Dover other than the caskets being unloaded and shipped on, and that wasn't the only place it happened. (Williams, 1991, p. 19)

Public Opinion and Media Restrictions

Media executives continued to fight the restrictions on information in the Gulf, but found little sympathy from the American public. A poll conducted by the Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press in January 1991 found that 76% of Americans thought the military was censoring news reports from the Gulf, and 79% thought this was a good idea (Times Mirror Center, 1991, pp. 12,16). In March 1991, the percentage of

respondents that thought it was a good idea to censor news out of the Gulf increased to 83% (Times Mirror Center, 1991).

The Ground War Implements New Restrictions

When U.S. and coalition forces mounted a large-scale ground offensive on February 23, 1991, Defense Secretary Cheney announced that press briefings at the Pentagon and Riyadh would be temporarily suspended. He expressed full confidence that the American people would support his decision:

I want to assure all of you that we understand our solemn obligation to the American people to keep them informed of developments, but I am confident that they understand that this policy is necessary to save lives and to reduce American casualties, as well as those of the coalition forces. (as cited in Sharkey, 1991, p. 144)

The news blackout ended the next day, once it had become apparent that the U.S. was going to win the ground war with minimal resistance from the Iraqis.

Six weeks after the beginning of Operation Desert Storm, the war was over. Although short in time, it provided the most important framework for future conflicts and the relationship between the military and the media.

Assessing the Restrictions

After the war, a Gannett Foundation Report stated, “More than direct censorship, it was a lack of access to people and places in the gulf region that hindered correspondents in gathering real news” (Gannett Foundation, 1991, p. xii). In response, 17 top-level news executives and editors sent a letter to Cheney that included the documentation of problems with the pools, escorts and security reviews. In addition, the letter included a Statement of Principles that should be considered for future guidelines. These principles set the following provisions:

- Independent reporting would be the principle means of coverage;
- Pools should be limited to the first 24 to 36 hours of a deployment and should be disbanded quickly in favor of unilateral coverage;
- Journalists should be given access to all major military units;
- Journalists should be allowed to ride on military vehicles whenever possible;
- The military would supply public affairs officers with working transmission materials for independent reporters to file timely stories with;
- Public affairs officers would not interfere with the news gathering process;
- Security reviews would be eliminated (News executives, letter, June 24, 1991).

By January 1992, all major points of the Statement of Principles were agreed upon, with the exception of the elimination of security reviews (News executives, letter, June 24, 1991).

Conclusion

The media pool deployed to the Middle East provided America and the world with what Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams called “the best coverage we’ve ever had” (Hanson, 1992, p. 128). However, the press pool system implemented during the Gulf War was criticized by members of the media. Most involved in this pool system never saw a battle or the tragedy of death, like those involved in the Vietnam War had. Many of the correspondents’ dispatches never made it back to their news organizations. And above all, military officers often controlled every movement of the press pool.

Eventually, 1,400 journalists covered the six-week war between Iraq and the coalition forces led by the United States. But the design of the pool system failed to take into account the specific needs of different types of media. Reporters complained that the number of pools was too few to produce adequate, objective coverage. But the American public really did not seem to mind, siding with the military’s need to censor reports from the Gulf. Walter Cronkite assessed the war coverage after the Gulf War in an address to a National Press Club forum. He stated:

We've been greatly concerned about freedom of the press and how we assure it in wartime circumstances...But it occurs to me that if the news media were as interested in covering the peace, and the things that lead up to the war – to commit just some small part of the appropriation that they had to dig into their pockets to find to cover the war – we might not have these wars...it's just possible that this country would have been alerted...because of the news coverage, and very possibly Hussein would not have moved into Kuwait in the first place. (Cronkite, 1991, pp. 35-36)

With the exception of small operations in the countries of Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, it would be a decade before a full-scale military operation would be implemented. This time, the nation would be facing a war like no other. And the American press was in the wings, waiting to be called up once again. Operations Enduring Freedom and Anaconda would be the first real test of the Statement of Principles adopted in January 1992.

CHAPTER 7

REPORTING THE NEW WAR: PRESS COVERAGE AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM

On September 11, 2001, the United States was thrust into a new kind of war. Unlike the glowing bombs of Baghdad that the American public witnessed a decade before, they watched as their own country was being attacked. Television news broadcasts were saturated with the images of hijacked planes crashing into the World Trade Center towers in New York City. Eventually the world watched them collapse under their own weight, ultimately killing thousands of people. And later, as the Pentagon was hit, Americans were enthralled by the images and continued to watch. Andrew Sullivan, former associate editor at *The New Republic*, posted this message on his personal news Web site on the day of the attacks:

I have been unable to think of anything substantive to write today. It is almost as if the usual conventions of journalism and analysis should somehow remain mute in the face of such an event. How can one analyze what one hasn't even begun to absorb? Numbness is part of the intent of these demons. (Nisbet, 2001, p. 2)

Like the Gulf War, Americans tuned to television for the latest information and the newest pictures produced by the tragedy. For the first time in television history, an unprecedented integration of media outlets occurred. CBS News coverage was also carried on its sister cable networks MTV and VH1. CNN coverage could be seen on TNT, TNN, and CourtTV. Even the all-sports network ESPN shed its programming in lieu of ABC News coverage. So essentially, Americans could not escape the televised images of the event.

But television was not the only media outlet that temporarily changed as a result of the event. Newspapers published special editions on the day of the attacks, most of which sold out almost immediately. The *San Antonio Express-News* printed 50,000 copies of its extra edition on September 11, all of which sold rapidly. Three weeks after the attacks, the newspaper was still selling 10,000 more copies per week than its usual circulation (Downey & Leonard, 2002, p. 248). Leonard Downey, Jr. and Robert Kaiser, both of the *Washington Post*, conceded that even though Americans tuned to television during the onslaught of the attacks, "...September 12 belonged to newspapers, and reminded us why, even now, decades into the electronic era, newspapers remain so important. On the twelfth, all across America, people who don't usually read the paper bought a copy and devoured it" (Downey & Kaiser, 2002, p. 62). Newspaper circulation increased exponentially on September 12. The *Washington Post* sold a million copies on that day, more than 150,000 more than its normal press run. The *Minneapolis Star Tribune* sold 50 percent more papers than usual (Downey & Kaiser, 2002, p. 62). Referred to as a terrorist attack on the United States, the events of September 11 would remain in prominence in print, broadcast, and electronic media for months. And it did not take long for media executives to start asking questions as to how the government would allow the media to cover this new war on terrorism.

The Pentagon Prepares for War

Once the shock and horror of September 11 started to subside somewhat, the media focused on where the first stage of retaliatory attacks would occur and how much information the press would be entitled to in reporting them. Pentagon officials immediately said that America's "new war" against terrorism would be fought with

unprecedented secrecy, including heavy press restrictions that had not been seen since the Gulf War (McIntyre, 2001). Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld began to warn the American media that they could expect little cooperation from the Pentagon because this was a new type of war in which secrecy was paramount (McIntyre, 2001). In a press conference almost a week after the terrorist attacks, President Bush said:

I want to make it clear to the American people that this administration will not talk about any plans we may or may not have. We will not jeopardize in any way, shape, or form anybody who wears the uniform of the United States. (McIntyre, 2001, para. 4)

To that end, the U.S. Department of Defense stopped posting the general locations of U.S. warships on the Internet. In addition, no plans were made to allow reporters to deploy with troops or report from warships.

The role of the media in the current conflict was debated immediately. Journalists became increasingly more concerned that they would receive less information and less access to U.S. troops than ever before. Pentagon officials were very up-front with worried journalists. Pentagon spokeswoman Torie Clarke consulted with many journalists in the beginning, explaining that the Pentagon would try to have journalists accompany combat troops, although “there may be some operations where it’s just not possible” (Kurtz, 2001, p. 11). On September 24, 2001, the Radio-Television News Directors Association (RTNDA) – a group very instrumental in the adoption of the Statement of Principles in 1992 – sent a letter to Rumsfeld asking to give the media as much access as possible to military actions. In the letter, RTNDA president Barbara Cochran wrote:

RTNDA members and all journalists are acutely aware of the need to balance national security considerations with the duty to inform the public truthfully. No news organization wants to be responsible for putting U.S. fighting men and women in harm’s way. But we also have the responsibility to keep the public

informed about key government activities, which surely include military operations.

I urge you to grant access as broadly as possible to the news media tasked to cover the military. To avoid the problems that arose during the Persian Gulf War, I hope the Pentagon will continue to support the nine principles of news coverage of combat agreed upon by the news media and the Defense Department and adopted as Pentagon policy on March 11, 1992. The principles provide a solid foundation for future coverage decisions. (B. Cochran, letter, September 24, 2001)

The Pentagon had good reason not to deploy media representatives with the initial movement of troops in Afghanistan. It must be understood that the media has often been scrutinized in regards to its coverage of terrorist activities. The proliferation of terrorist activities during the 1970s and 1980s has caused scholars and government officials to look into the media's role in promoting the terrorist cause (Eke, 1991; Bremer, 1991). According to these scholars, the media coverage of terrorist activities give these organizations a much needed venue for propaganda and possible hidden messages. And so with this idea in hand, government officials were very leery of allowing the press to cover the first stages of this "War on Terrorism." Many government officials felt that the accused perpetrator, Osama bin Laden, would use the media coverage not only as a ploy to further his cause, but also as a strategic planner. Essentially, they believed that he and the Taliban government of Afghanistan would monitor the media as their prime means of intelligence. The government worried that the military's plan would be weakened because media coverage would disrupt the element of surprise.

The Pentagon's Attempt to Calm Press Fears

Just two weeks after the attacks, Department of Defense (DOD) officials attempted to calm journalists' concerns that the media would be completely excluded

from initial operations in Afghanistan. In attempts to appease these fears, Colonel Lane Van de Steeg, coordinator of the DOD National Media Pool, said the department was in the process of making sure that the national media pool was ready to deploy to Afghanistan. Richard McGraw, principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, announced the first members of the national press pool would be deployed from October through December. Representatives were as follows: CBS Radio, NBC, *Time* magazine, the Associated Press and KRT, the *Baltimore Sun*, *Christian Science Monitor*, and *Media General*. The second wave of pool reporters would be deployed from January through March 2002. The pool would rotate every quarter, according to Defense Department records. Van de Steeg confessed, “We haven’t actually moved the pool – deployed it – since 1997. So it’s time we exercise it. We’re all rusty” (DOD News Transcript, September 28, 2001).

But the activation of the pool system did not come immediately. A week before the initial attacks in Afghanistan, U.S. troops were deployed to at least four Asian nations, but the national press pool remained idle (Shields, 2001, para. 3). In addition, even as the bombing campaign heightened, the Defense Department stated that it wanted to cut briefings from daily to twice a week (Shields, 2001, para. 3). This restricted journalists’ news gathering techniques and once again caused a stalemate between the media and the military. In response, 28 journalism organizations endorsed a statement challenging the imposed media restrictions in November 2001:

We, as leaders of national journalism organizations, express our concern over the increasing restrictions by the United States government that limit news gathering and inhibit the free flow of information in the wake of the September 11 attack.

...We recognize that these are perilous times when unusual measures must be considered. However, we believe that these restrictions pose dangers to American democracy and prevent American citizens from obtaining the information they need. (“Journalism Leaders,” 2001, para. 2)

The pool system, which had been criticized by media personnel since its inception after the war in Grenada, was once again scrutinized at the commencement of “Operation Enduring Freedom.” Once the pool was deployed, the Defense Department made it virtually impossible for the pool reporters to gain access to troops in neighboring Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and other countries. Sandy Johnson, Washington bureau chief for the Associated Press, stated, “We’re disappointed because the point in the pool is to get the media to areas where unilateral coverage is difficult if not impossible” (Shields, 2001, para. 8). Many journalists argued that it would be better to initialize an embedded media system in order to accommodate full media coverage of the events in Afghanistan. Within this system, journalists would be embedded in military units, accompanying troops into battle and reporting on what was occurring on the front. And although Pentagon officials toiled with the idea of this system with concerned journalists, they felt that the embedded system would endanger the security of initial operations in Afghanistan. However, as the operations continued, Pentagon officials eventually allowed reporters to be embedded with special forces in the region.

War Commences Amidst Compromises, Promises and Restrictions

The first bombs dropped in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, thus commencing the war on terrorism. On October 18, Rumsfeld formally accepted the Statement of Principles proposed during the Gulf War ensuring open and independent coverage of military action (Shaw, 2001). And although reporters did not accompany the initial

deployment of troops in Afghanistan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Victoria Clarke argued that the first time any significant number of conventional forces were on the ground in Afghanistan, the media were with them to cover the conflict (Brookings/Harvard Forum, 2002). To media executives, however, the media was deployed too late and was to accompanying troops from the onslaught of war. Once again, the Pentagon waited to deploy the news media until officials judged it safe to do so.

However, many journalists remained skeptical about the full adoption of the principles. For example, one principle opened the door for better access to troops in the field, something journalists immediately requested as talk of war was imminent. Specifically, journalists wanted to be aboard the USS Kitty Hawk, the base for special operations unit, as well as have access to troops in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and other countries in the Central Asia theater. Journalists were told that these requests were taken into consideration by top Pentagon officials. However, according to Sandy Johnson, Washington bureau chief for the Associated Press, “The answer so far has been no to every request” (Shaw, 2001, para. 7).

As the war progressed, access to combat missions became increasingly difficult for journalists in the region. In an interview with Peter Knightley, a war correspondent for the American armed forces’ newspaper *Stars and Stripes*, revealed that he had been informed of a Pentagon ruling that would not even allow him to accompany any invasion force (Knightley, 2001, para. 17).

Reporters and news organizations had no choice but to follow the restrictions placed on them by the Pentagon. In the immediate aftermath of September 11,

Afghanistan's Taliban regime ordered all foreigners, including journalists, to leave the country. If reporters entered Afghanistan on their own and against military stipulations, they risked being killed by the Taliban or being arrested by the armed forces. And because of such circumstances, by necessity, the American media had to rely heavily on the U.S. government's account of events.

Three days after the first bombings in Afghanistan, Peter Jennings began ABC's *World News Tonight* with a report on war coverage. In a conversation with reporter John McWethy, Jennings stated: "We've been [at war] three days now, [and] we've had three photographs of bomb damage...Is the Pentagon unable to access what it has done or just doesn't want to share it with the public?" McWethy replied by saying, "It appears, Peter, that the Pentagon does not want to share the details of what is going on. They keep saying that it is a different kind of war, and so far it has been a war with very little information" (Farhi, 2001, p. C1).

It needs to be understood that journalists did go beyond the protection of the coalition military to venture out unilaterally. Doyle McManus, Washington bureau chief for the *Los Angeles Times*, said reporters enjoy "excellent access to the areas of Afghanistan not under the control of the United States" ("Terrorism and First Amendment," 2001, para. 4). However, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, 10 journalists have been killed during the war as of March 2002, including *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl, who was murdered at the hands of his kidnappers, a group of Pakistani extremists.

One documented incident of outright censoring of the press came in December of 2001 when the Pentagon locked war reporters and photographers in a warehouse to

prevent them from covering American troops who were killed or wounded by a stray bomb north of Kandahar. The Pentagon later apologized for unnecessarily restricting reporters access, admitting that it had made a mistake. But veteran war correspondent Peter Arnett, who was criticized deeply for his pro-Iraqi views during the Gulf War, said this corralling of reporters was not unusual. He reflected on how the military detained reporters from the central battlefield in Panama for nearly 36 hours so they “could clean up so we don’t see anything” (“Terrorism and First Amendment,” 2001, para. 7).

Like Pearl, many journalists went beyond military restrictions. Unilateral coverage was important in obtaining unfiltered, government information about the war. Prior to the October 7 bombing in Afghanistan, more than 200 journalists were convening in Tajikistan, hoping to buy a \$300 helicopter ride into northern Afghanistan. According to Neal Hickey, “Some went by donkey, others in truck convoys navigating treacherous mountain terrain. Several sneaked into Taliban territory garbed from head to toe like women in traditional burkhas” (Hickey, 2002). Reporters’ lives were at risk, but they wanted independent coverage and not rely solely on the Pentagon or national press pool for reports.

Bin Laden Video Debate

Just a few days after the initial bombings in Afghanistan, a video tape of Osama bin Laden was released by Al Jazeera, the Arab television news station. The White House immediately objected to the global broadcast of this tape, asking the five major U.S. television networks to limit the coverage of it.

During the Vietnam War, American Prisoner of War Jeremiah Denton evaded his captors and sent a filmed message home. While delivering a rehearsed statement to

Vietnamese television about how well he was being treated, he blinked out the word “torture” in Morse Code (Spencer, 2001, para. 1). Officials in the Bush administration suggested that bin Laden may employ similar tactics in the release of his video tape. White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer viewed the videotapes as being “propaganda of a most insidious nature; at worst, it could be actually signaling to his operatives” and “inciting people to kill Americans” (Allen, 2001, p. A8).

The networks gave in to government pressure and did not air the unedited videotape to the public. Dennis Neal, opinion editor of *The News Leader*, wrote:

What was perhaps most unsettling about the episode was the unanimity and swiftness with which the network heads agreed to limit their coverage. From now on, only snippets of video issued by bin Laden or his followers will be broadcast. Rhetoric urging violence against Americans will be excised, and any reports accompanying the tapes would contain “appropriate context.” (Neal, 2001, para. 3)

Possibly unknowingly, the networks would set precedence on how the war would be covered. They would succumb not only to government pressures, but public pressures as well.

The Media’s Conformity to Public Sentiment

Perhaps the most heightened criticism by media veterans and scholars of the press beyond September 11 was its conformity to public sentiment. For decades, media professionals have taken pride in their individuality and their ability to scrutinize public leaders, policies and actions. But in the wake of September 11, the media changed their tune. Two weeks after the initial attacks on the United States, Fleischer stated at a press conference, “The reminder is to all Americans that they need to watch what they say” (Swanson, 2001, p. 28A). And although these remarks were stricken from public record,

the media seemed to take this advice to heart as well. The media's obsession with scandal, sex, and celebrities immediately subsided after the attacks and during the ongoing war in Afghanistan. "Anti-American" sentiments in the press were punished and an ultimate suppression of the First Amendment happened within media organizations themselves.

Only 11 days after the terrorist attacks, Tom Gutting, city editor for the *Texas City Sun*, wrote a column criticizing President Bush. He wrote, "What we are stuck with is a crippled president...He's not a leader, he's a puppet" (Swanson, 2001, p. 28A). He later referred to Bush as a "scared child seeking refuge in his mother's bed after having a nightmare" for not returning to Washington, D.C., immediately after the attacks. The next day, Gutting was fired and the *Texas City Sun* issued a front-page apology that ended with the statement, "God bless America!"

Commentator and syndicated columnist Ann Coulter was dropped from two newspapers after a column recommended invading countries, killing their leaders and converting them to Christianity. Another column discussed "suspicious-looking swarthy males" and a policy to require passports on all domestic flights (National Coalition Against Censorship, 2001).

In addition, syndicated radio host Peter Werbe was dropped by KOMY-AM in Santa Cruz, California, in early October 2001 after questioning U.S. military actions in Afghanistan (National Coalition Against Censorship, 2001).

These are just a few examples, but media outlets all over the country were cautious in airing dissent against the government after the attacks and during the initial stages of "Operation Enduring Freedom" and "Operation Anaconda" in Afghanistan.

Jonah Goldberg, online editor for *National Review* magazine, stated, “Dissenters now have an obligation to think twice about saying some of the stupid stuff they say in peace time” (Swanson, 2001, p. 28A).

Conclusion

Future research must commence to fully understand the impact of media restrictions during the “War on Terrorism.” It is predicted that the war could last years, and be fought on numerous fronts. And so, much analysis is to come. However, in the few months after the attacks on the United States, the media’s conformity to public sentiment was strong, and the public still appears to agree with strict restrictions on the media.

CHAPTER 8

METHODOLOGY

Thus far, this thesis shows the evolution of restrictions of the press caused by the poor relationships between the media, the military, and the public. Furthermore, this thesis presents historical documents and speeches that have been examined by various researchers, illustrating the progression of animosity and limitations set forth upon the press. The theoretical aspect of this thesis illustrates the progression of First Amendment suppression and continual animosity between the press and the military by examining specific media coverage of two major offensives in two very different wars. Through the use of content analysis, the remaining sections of this thesis will set out to answer the three research questions presented in the first chapter.

Content Analysis

For many years, various authors have defined and used content analysis in their research. Weber (1990) states that content analysis is a method “that uses a set of procedures to make valid inferences from text” (Weber, 1990, p. 9). He continues the definition by saying, “These inferences are about the sender(s) of the messages, the message itself, or the audience of the message” (Weber, 1990, p. 9).

Yet in a different approach, Krippendorff’s definition of this research method emphasizes “the relationship between the content of texts and their institutional, societal, or cultural contexts” (Weber, 1990, p. 82).

Stempel takes a logical view of the definition. According to him:

Content analysis is a formal system for doing something that we all do informally rather frequently, drawing conclusions from observations of content. We express opinions about the adequacy of various kinds of coverage by newspapers, magazines, radio stations, and television stations. Those opinions are based on what we observe as readers or listeners. (Stempel, 1989, p. 124)

It is Stempel's definition that coincides with the thoughts of many media researchers.

Although, as consumers, the public casually reads a daily newspaper or watches its favorite television shows, it is the job of the media scholar to delve into the popularity of different media entities.

Holsti believes that regardless of the definition of content analysis, three basic requirements must be met. First, the research method must maintain objectivity by relying on formulated procedures and rules. Also, categories created in the analysis must be done systematically and consistently. Finally, according to Holsti, "the findings must have theoretical relevance" to the recipient of the message (Holsti, 1969, p. 5).

Throughout their various studies of mass media content, Shoemaker and Reese (1991) argue that scholars should organize content research around specific theoretical perspectives. These perspectives include the following: 1) content reflects social reality with little or no distortion; 2) content is influenced by media workers' socialization and attitudes; 3) content is influenced by media routines; 4) content is influenced by other social institutions and forces, and; 5) content is a function of ideological positions and maintains the status quo (Shoemaker & Reese, 1991, pp. 4-5).

In conducting a content analysis for this research, these perspectives come into play. The theoretical perspectives Shoemaker and Reese present assume that mass media disseminate information that mirrors sentiments of society. Therefore, in judging the negativity of reporting during both the Tet offensive and in the early days of war in

Afghanistan, it is important to make the assumption that the mass media is reflecting public opinion. Therefore, as previous research points out, the negative sentiments of the public about the Vietnam War should produce more negative coverage in the newspapers of the time. In the same regard, the patriotic flare of the public during the war in Afghanistan should produce less negative connotations in the media's reporting of the events.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Content Analysis

As media research evolves, arguments can be made about the validity of content analysis as a research method. Researchers such as Bernard (1988) criticize the use of content analysis, saying there are many methodological problems in conducting such research. He states that if one person creates codes and categories to be used in the analysis of a document, validity may be compromised. In addition, if one person does all the coding, there is no supreme check of reliability. Moreover, a systematic mistake may be made in deciding which categories to use when coding different words (Bernard, 1988, p. 299).

But despite such problems, many researchers believe content analysis is appropriate in some studies (Holsti, 1969; Krittendorff, 1980; Weber, 1990). Content analysis is an unassuming method of data collection. Problems with data collection influencing results are virtually eliminated. Holsti provides three classes of research problems that may be addressed using the content analysis research method. The first class involves data access and evaluation. In studying war reporting, it is appropriate to access data in newspaper, television, and radio coverage. Previous issues of major

newspapers are readily available in libraries. Therefore, the focus of this study works well with the content analysis method.

Secondly, Holsti points out that content analysis addresses situations in which language of the subject may be a necessary component of the investigation (Holsti, 1969, p. 17). In examining the negativity of language used in this study, content analysis provides a means of examination. Investigating speeches, interviews, and first-hand accounts allows content analysis to be an effective mean in this study.

Finally, Holsti understands that there are situations in which the volume of material to be investigated is larger in scope than is realistically possible for the researcher to examine. Using content analysis, the researcher can sample material, analyze this material, and make assumptions based on the samples (Holsti, 1969, p. 17). When looking at the vastness of the Vietnam War and the War on Terrorism, content analysis proves productive in narrowing the scope of articles to a smaller sample to be examined.

Document Selection and Sampling

The documents selected for this research were all found in issues of the *New York Times*. The *New York Times* was selected for various reasons. First, the *Times* is an influential newspaper, read by government and military officials, world leaders, and a widely-circulated public. Its coverage is in-depth, containing roughly 100,000 words a day – about as many as a 290-page book (Downie & Kaiser, 2002, p. 65). In times of war, the *New York Times*' stories are often republished in local newspapers, accounting for a wider circulation and therefore, influence of a larger audience, rather than just subscribers to the *Times* (Downie & Kaiser, 2002, p. 101). The availability of the *New*

York Times also contributed to the selection of documents from the newspaper. Finally, the newspaper reported events of both Vietnam and Afghanistan, making the ability for true comparisons accessible.

Articles from two periods were examined for this study: January 31, 1968 – February 10, 1968 and October 8, 2001 – October 18, 2001. These periods were selected because of the historical events that took place during these times. The 1968 editions encompassed the Tet offensive, while the October 2001 editions included coverage of the beginning of the war in Afghanistan. The 11-day period was used as the sample time frame because the end of the Tet offensive occurred at the end of the 11th day of reporting. After this day, no prevalent or consecutive reporting was made about the offensive. Therefore, only the first 11 days of the war in Afghanistan was covered. This method was used to ensure that equal coverage in terms of days was accomplished and consistency in this study would be obtained.

Since the *New York Times* provided daily editions during both periods, a total of 22 newspapers were available for review. Only stories pertaining specifically to the Tet offensive and the campaign in Afghanistan were coded. Sections A, B, and Editorial pages were examined. Therefore, references to the war efforts appearing in Business, Sports, or Entertainment sections of the newspaper were excluded. In addition, full-length transcripts of speeches were excluded because they did not exclusively pertain to the war efforts. During both periods, the *New York Times* provided a recap of the week's events in the Sunday edition. These recaps were coded because they both specifically mentioned conflict of the Tet offensive and the fighting in Afghanistan.

During the sample period, a total of 81 stories were examined: 37 stories from January 31 – February 10, 1968 and 44 stories from October 8 – October 18, 2001.

Coding Procedure

Designing and applying a consistent coding scheme is imperative to the process and validity of content analysis. Several categories were established to answer each of the research questions presented in Chapter 1. A review of these categories is essential in compiling the results of this research.

Research Question 1

Because of limitations set forth by government and military officials, correspondents must rely on government reports from the front. Although some reporters are able to go out on their own to report on events in Afghanistan, the number of first-hand accounts of events must be limited. A comparison of sources is indispensable to draw conclusions in this study.

Five categories were established for research question 2. The first category is “government sources,” which include Pentagon officials, the president, press releases, and official reports. A second category, “first-hand accounts,” included quotes from soldiers in the field, witnesses, personnel aboard air craft carriers, and civilians from the region. The third established category is “enemy reports.” During the Tet offensive, this category included quotes from the Vietcong, Chinese and North Vietnamese officials, and reports broadcast on Hanoi radio. During Afghanistan, the sources included Taliban leaders, Al Queda officials and Osama bin Laden. The fourth category was “other world leaders.” This category included quotes from government officials outside of the United

States. The final category was labeled “other” and includes quotes from family members of casualties or soldiers, or members of various world organizations.

Research Question 2

Similar to research question one, question two pertains to sources for pictures. Only two categories were established: “government origination” and “media origination.” Although still an offspring of government restrictions, press pool photos were categorized as “media origination.” Other news organizations, such as the Associated Press, United Press International, and Reuters, fall under the “media organization” category. Photos provided by the Pentagon, the U.S. Navy, Army, or Marines, were categorized as “government origination.”

Research Question 3

In examining newspaper photos and their sources, this research focused on the type of pictorial presented. Photos were coded as “combat” and “non-combat” pictures, as well as “positive,” “negative,” or “neutral” connotations presented within the photograph. For most photographs, captions were examined in order to clarify the image’s sentiment.

CHAPTER 9

RESULTS

During the sample period, a total of 72 stories were identified as appropriate for coding: 28 stories coded from January 31 – February 10, 1968, and 44 stories from October 8 – October 18, 2001 (see Appendix A for a list of articles coded for this study).

According to the above data, more stories were available for coding during the Afghanistan offensive than those written during the Tet offensive. Therefore, the most accurate method of comparing the media coverage of both events is to first examine both individually, then establish percentages, and finally compare the results.

The results from this analysis revealed several interesting trends in the way each offensive was reported by the media. First, in regard to sources, the overall use of attributes in Vietnam was almost identical to those used in Afghanistan. In fact, there was an average of 14.21 sources used per story during the Vietnam sample, and an average of 15.14 sources used during the sample period in Afghanistan. Out of the 28 stories coded during the Tet offensive, 398 attributes were made. Of these 398 attributions, 198 came from government officials. Another 69 quotes came from first-hand accounts. The media accounted for 26 attributions while enemy reports accounted for 17 sources. In addition, another 40 attributions came from various world leaders, while 48 additional sources were coded as “other.” Table 1 represents the raw data of this information.

Table 1

Primary Attributions Published from January 31 – February 10, 1968

Source	Number of attributions
Government sources	N=198
First-hand accounts	N=69
Media	N=26
Enemy reports	N=17
Other world leaders	N=40
Other	N=48
Total	N=398

In Afghanistan, however, the number of sources used was much higher.

Throughout the 44 coded stories, 666 attributions were made. Nearly half of these attributions (N=302), came from government officials. Another 177 quotes came from first-hand accounts. The media represented another 36 quotes, while other world leaders accounted for 98 attributions. Enemy reports were included 7% of the time (N=47). Only 6 attributions were coded as “other.” Table 2 represents the raw data of this information.

Table 2

Primary Attributions Published from October 8-18, 2001

Source	Number of attributions
Government sources	N=302
First-hand accounts	N=177
Media	N=36
Enemy reports	N=47
Other world leaders	N=98
Other	N=6
Total	N=666

Table 3 compares the percentages of sources used during the two time periods coded for this study.

Table 3

Comparison of Attributions from the Sample Periods

Source	Vietnam	Afghanistan
Government Sources	50%	45%
First-hand accounts	17%	27%
Media	7%	5%
Enemy Reports	4%	7%
Other world leaders	10%	15%
Other	12%	1%

By strictly looking at the quantitative data presented thus far, it is apparent that the complaints journalists have had over the years – limited access to the battlefield and significant sources – is not supported when comparing the two offensives. In Vietnam, reporters relied on government sources 50% of the time, while ascertaining first-hand accounts only 17% of the time. In Afghanistan, reporters relied on government sources 45% of the time, while first-hand sources accounted for 27% of quotable material. However, the types of quotes and accounts obtained by reporters in Vietnam truly surpass those obtained by reporters in Afghanistan. In essence, the quotes attributed during the Tet offensive are much more personal in nature. In a report from the first day of the Tet offensive, correspondent Charles Mohr wrote:

“One VC threw a grenade at me,” said Private Healy. “It hit the wall and fell down about two feet from me. I dived for cover and didn’t get hurt. I killed that man with a grenade and later got three more with another grenade.”

His grim face was twitching with emotion as he told his story and a major gently put his arm around the youth’s shoulders. (Mohr, 1968, p. A1)

Mohr’s account of the attack on the embassy is thick in detail. He was able to convey to the reader what was being experienced, because he, too, was experiencing it.

On the first day of the attacks in Afghanistan, reporter Douglas Jehl gives a different type of account to his readers. He writes:

Commanders have refused to discuss the mission in detail, saying that they did not want to jeopardize the safety of the aircraft, pilots and crew. They would not allow reporters to interview pilots in the hours leading up to the strikes, saying they did not want to distract them from their work.

...Among the crowd of sailors who watched the planed take off – and in some cases, filmed the event with video cameras – was a young man from the Bronx who gave his first name as Nelson.

“My aunt works at the World Trade Center, but she was away,” he said. “So we were some of the lucky ones. I’ve been waiting for this for a long time. The faster we bomb, the sooner we can go home.” (Jehl, 2001, p. B3)

Notice that an apparent shift occurs in reporting styles. In the Tet account, the reporter gives vivid details about the attack. But in Afghanistan, the coverage includes an obvious condemnation of the military’s suppression of information, followed by a patriotic flair in the form of a direct quote. The sailor quoted in Afghanistan appears to have the same basic vantage point as the reporter does. Thus, both appear detached from the action at hand. As another example of this detachment, reporter Thom Shanker wrote:

A B-52 pilot who took part in the mission said tonight that he and his crew did not encounter any air defense threat for which they were unprepared, though he declined to discuss specifics. “There was nothing that put us unduly at risk,” the pilot said in a telephone interview, speaking on the condition he be identified only by his call name, Woodstock. (Shanker, 2001, p. A10)

Although the above quote was coded as a first-hand account, it is obvious that the reporter was truly separated from the action. It should also be pointed out that the reporter received the quote over the phone. To that end, technology has truly changed the face of war reporting. Emotions and sentiments that once needed to be obtained through face-to-face contact, can now be obtained over the telephone. However, in examining and comparing the discourse of the above quotes, it becomes apparent that detachment is usual, and in many cases, accepted by journalists. Shanker and Jehl were not readily able to convey the vivid detail that Mohr was able to penetrate to his readers.

It must be noted that most of the first-hand accounts (66%) obtained by reporters in Afghanistan came from soldiers on air craft carriers who had just returned from air strikes, like the one attributed by Shanker. During the infancy of the war in Afghanistan, no reporter received such powerful first-hand accounts as reporters in Vietnam did.

Qualitatively speaking, Vietnam correspondents provided a much richer account of combat. On the first day of the Tet offensive, reporter Thomas Buckley wrote:

As the fighting raged, this correspondent was pinned down for 15 minutes behind a military police jeep as tracer bullets arched a few feet overhead.

The bodies of at least two American military policemen lay perhaps 50 yards away. Vietcong and civilian dead also sprawled on the sidewalk. (Buckley, 1968, p. A1)

Although few in numbers, Afghanistan correspondents captured the atrocities of war in first-hand accounts as well. Yet, reporters in Afghanistan focused more on the plight of civilians than the tribulations of soldiers, due in part to availability of civilian sources. On the first day of the Afghanistan offensive, reporter David Rohde wrote:

The strikes immediately led to a flow of refugees. At 2:45 this morning, 50 men, women and children were seen fleeing north away from the front line out of the village of Ravat.

They carried their clothes and other belongings on their heads, but made little noise as they rushed out of the area. Rahim Shah, an elderly man whose eyes were wide with fear, said he and other villagers had been ordered to leave by alliance commanders. (Rohde, 2001, p. A1)

The imagery produced in these two excerpts are truly different. Buckley gives a gruesome picture of death, while Rohde attempts to find that vividness, but falls short. In my opinion, it is because of the emotional attachment Buckley had during the Vietnam War, and the emotional detachment Rohde had. This is not to say, however, that Rohde's detachment could be helped. When the government limits access to the battlefield, they limit the emotional attachment as well. This sentiment prevails through the writings of the reporters, and the attributions of the soldiers.

In the evolution of newspaper management, photographs have become more prevalent in the daily publication of major periodicals. Photos are powerful and are meant to provide needed imagery to the reader. Therefore, it is necessary to examine photographic content to fully understand the detachment of reporters from the action of current warfare. But because photos are more abundant in modern newspaper publication, a higher sample of photos were published in the *New York Times* during the coded period in 2001 than that of 1968. For this study, a total of 77 photographs were coded: 30 photographs during the 1968 period, and 47 photographs were coded during the 2001 period. For both periods of study, a series of crosstabulation analysis were run to determine if the sources of the images contributed to the attitude the image portrayed.

First, the source of photographs must be ascertained. During the first period, only two media sources were apparent in the publication of pictures: The Associated Press (AP) and the United Press International (UPI). The AP contributed 22 photos, while UPI contributed 8 photos. During the Tet offensive, no government issued photographs were published. Table 4 illustrates the type of photo presented based on the source used.

Table 4

Photo Source and Type Published from January 31 – February 10, 1968

Photo source	Photo type		Total
	Combat	Non-combat	
AP	N=10	N=2	N=22
UPI	N=5	N=3	N=8
Total	N=15	N=15	N=30

During the first two weeks of the Tet offensive, it was determined by the coders of this study that no photos should be coded as “positive.” Therefore, the photographs published either illustrated a “neutral” or “negative” sentiment. A typical negative photograph published during the Tet offensive showed death, destruction or loneliness. An Association Press photo published on the second day of attacks showed bodies of guerillas sprawled lifeless on the sidewalk. In the background is a burning building that these guerillas had set fire to before being killed. Obviously, the photographer was in the middle of the action, readily available to capture the aftermath of the attack. In a similar light, the AP published a photo of a South Vietnamese officer carrying the body of one of his children from his home. Her young body is limp in his arms, and his helmet-covered face shows his pain and disgust. But probably the most atrocious example of a sequence of negative photos appeared on February 2, 1968. AP photographer Eddie Adams captured the execution of a Vietcong in a series of three photos. The first shows the executioner walking with the man as his face gazes toward the ground. In the second photo, the gun is pointed at the man, and the photographer captures the fear on his face as his eyes are closed and his lips are obviously trembling. The final photo shows the body of the dead prisoner on the street, with the executioner putting his revolver back in its holster.

Neutral photos, on the other hand, typically showed the outside of the embassy walls, or soldiers walking the streets. No death or destruction is conveyed in these pictures. For example, on February 3, 1968, the *New York Times* published a photo of an armor tank advancing across a deserted street. It simply conveyed a picture of tank movement, and not ramifications of tank assaults.

Table 5 represents the raw data of the views projected by each published photograph during the first sampled period, according to the source.

Table 5

Photo Source and Sentiment Published from January 31 – February 10, 1968

Photo source	Photo sentiment		Total
	Negative	Neutral	
AP	N=18	N=4	N=22
UPI	N=7	N=1	N=8
Total	N=25	N=5	N=30

The first crosstabulation analysis performed pertained to the type of photo published (combat vs. non-combat) and also to the sentiment the photo presented (in this case, negative or neutral). Table 6 represents the results of this crosstabulation.

Table 6

Crosstabulation of Photo Type and Sentiment Published During the Tet Offensive

Photo type	Photo sentiment		Total
	Negative	Neutral	
Combat	N=11	N=4	N=15
Non-combat	N=14	N=1	N=15
Total	N=25	N=5	N=30

The first ten days of the war in Afghanistan produced photos from a variety of sources. Media sources during the coded period include the AP, Reuters, *The New York Times*, and Agence France-Presse. Government photographs were also published during

the studied period. Table 7 illustrates the type of photo presented based on the source used.

Table 7

Photo Source and Type Published From October 8-18, 2001

Photo source	Photo type		Total
	Combat	Non-combat	
AP	N=6	N=8	N=14
Reuters	N=4	N=3	N=7
<i>NY Times</i>	N=3	N=7	N=10
Agence France-Presse	N=4	N=4	N=8
Government	N=5	N=3	N=8

Unlike the results ascertained during the first time period, photographs published during the first two weeks of Afghanistan produced both positive and negative sentiments. Neutral sentiments were also coded during the established time period. For the most part, a typical neutral image showed planes taking off from aircraft carriers. In some photos, aircraft are shown lined up on carriers, ready to take flight. Similar to negative photos presented during the Tet offensive, photos representing a negative nature in Afghanistan showed destruction of villages, or in very few instances, images of death. On October 10, 2001, *The New York Times*' photographer Vincent Laforet photographed a mother of a 13 year-old boy holding his limp body in her arms after he was killed. Her face is shrouded, but her lips can be seen somewhat open, as if she was crying aloud. This was the only photo depicting death during the second sample period. A typical positive

photograph conveyed a sense of patriotism and humanitarianism through the images presented. For example, on October 10, 2001, U.S. Air Force photographer Heather Zokal showed members of the U.S. Fifth Quartermaster Detachment struggling with a large container of daily rations for air dropping into the villages of Afghanistan. Three men dressed in combat fatigues are rolling the large, refrigerator-type box into an upright position. Readers can see the determination on the faces of the soldiers. Table 8 shows the results of this coding.

Table 8

Photo Source and Sentiment Published From October 8-18, 2001

Photo source	Photo sentiment			Total
	Positive	Negative	Neutral	
AP	N=0	N=7	N=7	N=14
Reuters	N=1	N=3	N=3	N=7
<i>NY Times</i>	N=0	N=5	N=5	N=10
Agence France-Presse	N=1	N=1	N=6	N=8
Government	N=4	N=0	N=4	N=8

Like the first crosstabulation, the second crosstabulation analysis performed pertained to the type of photo published and also to the sentiment the photo presented. Table 9 represents the results of the second crosstabulation.

Table 9

Crosstabulation of Photo Type and Sentiment Published During Afghanistan Period

Photo source	Photo sentiment			Total
	Positive	Negative	Neutral	
Combat	N=3	N=8	N=11	N=22
Non-combat	N=3	N=8	N=14	N=25
Total	N=6	N=16	N=25	N=47

Table 10 compares the two offensives in terms of all three variables. Note that all media entities are grouped together as “media” in the table.

Table 10

Overall Percentage Figures for Photos Published During the Two Periods

Source	Photo type		Photo sentiment		
	Combat	Non-combat	Positive	Negative	Neutral
V-Media	50%	50%	0%	83%	17%
V-Government	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
A-Media	44%	56%	5%	41%	54%
A-Government	63%	37%	50%	0%	50%

CHAPTER 10

DISCUSSION

The media have chronicled American history since the country's inception. They have been present for tragedy, triumphs, peace and conflicts. It holds the responsibility of communicating to the people of the nation, becoming the vital link between the public, the government, and the military – referred to as Clausewitz's "remarkable trinity" (as cited in Summers, 1989, p. 6). Some scholars still believe the media continue to play a vital role in contemporary military operations (Hill, 1997). But the war in Vietnam proved to change the overall role of the press in wartime. The technological advance of television and its graphic images truly transformed the way Americans viewed war. The lingering negative view of the press' efforts in Vietnam caused a disadvantageous shift in public opinion. But more importantly, the war illustrated a detrimental shift in the relationship between the media and the military. The research presented throughout this thesis explored this shift in the relationship, and implications that were to follow, including what should be termed as "complaint discourse" among the media. Although most U.S. troops who served in Grenada, Panama, the Persian Gulf, and Afghanistan were not old enough to remember Vietnam, the conflict ultimately changed the working relationship between the soldiers and the press. The Gulf War in particular showed strong influences of the Vietnam War. A study conducted by the Gannett Foundation Media Center to examine print and broadcast media from August 1990 to March 1991 found that the word "Vietnam" was used 7,299 times in major newspapers, magazines, and nightly

news broadcasts. This is compared to Saddam Hussein's name, which appeared only 1,170 times during the same period (Gannett Foundation, 1991). At the conclusion of the war in the Gulf, President George Bush victoriously announced, "This is a proud day for America. By God, we've kicked the Vietnam Syndrome once and for all" (as cited in Naparstek, 1993, chap. 5). This was evidence that the war in Vietnam was fresh in the minds of America's leaders and in the media as well.

The Vietnam War ended a nostalgic era for journalists. This would be the last war that correspondents would enjoy unrestricted media access to the battlefield. But because of media and combat technological advances, the ability for total press access is lost.

Historical precedence for the development of the military-media conflict lies in technological advances that have evolved. Just as new technology is imperative to military operations, it has become a significant constituent of the press as well. Perhaps the overwhelming factor for military officials about changing technology was the immediacy in which news could reach American homes. Satellite technology offers instantaneous relay of news from the front, causing serious concern of national and troop security by members of the military. Neil Postman writes:

Of course, like the brain itself, every technology has an inherent bias. It has within its physical form a predisposition toward being used in certain ways and not others. Only those who know nothing of the history of technology believe that technology is entirely neutral. (Postman, 1985, p. 84)

Postman's words become rhetoric of military sentiment. Military officials have often charged the media with swaying public opinion regarding the Vietnam War. Just as Postman describes, many high-ranking military officials believe it was the television media bias that proliferated the negative images of the war into America's living rooms.

But Postman argues that another facet of television can be detrimental to war reporting standards: "...Entertainment is the supra-ideology of all discourse on television. No matter what is depicted or from what point of view, the overarching presumption is that it is there for our amusement and pleasure" (Postman, 1985, p. 87). This statement is examined in the context of evidence presented throughout this thesis. Television's entertainment value – its vivid portrayal of images and words – has caused it to become the preferred medium of the public. But hard news stories, such as war, might not have a credible place among television's entertainment perspective. So perhaps, even when war is being reported by television journalists, it is being presented from an entertainment standpoint. It is this standpoint that causes many in the military to judge the television media as not credible, causing continued media-military strife.

Marshall McLuhan writes about the social consequences of advanced technology:

In a culture like ours, long accustomed to splitting and dividing all things as a means of control, it is sometimes a bit of a shock to be reminded that, in operational and practical fact, the medium is the message. This is merely to say that the personal and social consequences of any medium – that is, of any extension of ourselves – result from the new scale that is introduced into our affairs by each extension of ourselves, or by any new technology. (McLuhan, 1964, p. 23).

Within the context of this quote, it is important to examine the relationship between technological advances and the public's lingering view of press coverage of the Vietnam War. This thesis looks at implications of both factors. But, ultimately, these factors have caused the poor relationship between the military and the media. McLuhan's words were written during the infancy of the Vietnam War. But the impact of his statement is prominent still today. Television – and ensuing technological advances – have indeed become an extension of our culture. The role of the television press in Vietnam is

construed differently by various individuals. Television was no longer just an observer of events; it had become a true participant in the war in Vietnam. Journalist Morley Safer's 1966 comments reiterates McLuhan's assumption that the "medium is the message":

The camera can describe in excruciating harrowing detail what war is all about. The cry of pain, the shattered face – it's all there on film, and out it goes into millions of American homes during the dinner hour. It is true that on its own every piece of war film takes on a certain anti-war character, simply because it does not glamorize or romanticize. In battle, men do not die with a clean shot through the heart, they are blown to pieces. Television tells it that way. (Braestrup, 1985, p. 67)

As a result, the American public would not be able to witness first-hand accounts of the horrors of war in Grenada, Panama, Persian Gulf, and Afghanistan like they were permitted to during Vietnam. For military officials, the underlying assumption that the press turned public opinion away from the government during the Vietnam conflict causes the relationship to continue to be dismal. Without the technological advance of television bringing the images of war into the living rooms of the world, the relationship might be better. However, no one can attempt to stop technological advances. Therefore, from the technological perspective, perhaps there is no way to mend the media-military relationship.

By strictly looking at the quantitative data presented in this research, it is apparent that the complaint discourse exhibited by journalists after the Vietnam War is unwarranted when comparing the two offensives. But because of the overall lack of press access to the battlefield, qualitatively speaking, an emotional detachment has occurred in both sources material, and photographs.

As presented in this thesis, the powerful images of television have been attributed to changing public opinion during the Vietnam War, causing many military officials to

become skeptical of the media. But images presented in print provide the same type of impact. Except in print, the images can become stronger – engraved in black and white to be revisited over and over again. The photos coded for this study are two-fold. In Vietnam, the powerful images showed death, destruction, executions, Americans under fire, and fear in civilians' faces. Interestingly enough, no photos found within the coded time period could be considered positive. At the time, *The New York Times* did not publish any government issued photos. All photos came from wire services, but all showed the atrocities of war. Out of the 30 photos coded during this time period, 22 were perceived by the coders as negative. The other 8 could simply be coded as neutral. So television was not the only media entity showing the negativity of the Vietnam War. As stated previously in this thesis, the Tet offensive became the turning point in the way the war would be reported. The data for this study concedes to military official's complaint about the media presenting a one-sided, negative view of the offensive.

The war in Afghanistan is truly a different type of war. Therefore, the images presented during this conflict would have different connotations than those published during the Tet offensive. Because press access was so limited during the first few days of the war in Afghanistan, the *New York Times* had to rely on a few government-issued photographs. And within these photographs, the sentiment portrayed was much more positive than media-issued photographs. In fact, of the eight government-issued photographs, none portrayed a negative connotation. However, media-issued photographs were considered positive only 5% of the time.

Technology was prevalent in reporting both wars. It was not uncommon for correspondents to give great detail on the type of military technology used in each

offensive. Reports published during the Tet offensive provided an enormous amount of emphasis on technological advances of the military. Even headlines focused on the type of weapon used. This aspect is important to examine. As presented in previous chapters, the military has defended its claim that first-hand reporting of war is too dangerous for reporters. Therefore, limitations must be set, according to military officials. However, judging by the content of the news stories presented during the Tet offensive, military technological advancements were just as prevalent as they are in modern wars. In fact, the reporters during the Vietnam era made a conscious effort to report on the dangers they, and the American troops, were facing due to the military advances.

Public opinion is very important in winning a war, as presented in prior chapters. During the sampled time period, editorials and letters to the editor were used to convey public opinion. Yet, only a few of each were published during the Tet offensive. Those that were published focused on the negativity of the attack on the embassy, not necessarily a critique of America's involvement in the war as a whole. During the Afghanistan conflict, editorials and letters were much more accessible. All were very supportive of America's efforts. During the sampled period, none showed any negativity towards the war in Afghanistan.

The sample time periods for this study shows some weakness in the results. Because this study compared a ground war to an air war, the combat itself was completely different. Future researchers must look beyond the first two weeks of both conflicts. Since the Tet offensive was considered the turning point in the media-military relationship, perhaps similar research should be conducted focusing on two months after the offensive. In the same respects, the ground war in Afghanistan happened two weeks

into the conflict. So further research should be conducted focusing on ground war efforts and examine how sources and photos were obtained. This would give a better representation because the same type of conflict could be studied. It is difficult to come up with a secure comparison of reporting on the two conflicts because they were so different. As presented in this chapter, this is a case of ground war vs. air war. To get a better understanding of the ramifications of restrictions, future researchers must compare ground war vs. ground war.

Like the photograph comparisons presented in this study, perhaps future researchers should look at the sentiments presented in sourced material in the coverage of the events. This would give researchers an idea as to what type of quotes is being used in the reporting. Perhaps more anti-American sentiments would be apparent after the Tet offensive while more pro-American sentiments would be conveyed during the Afghanistan conflict. Since propaganda is so important in war efforts, one might hypothesize that government sources would appear to convey a more positive message than other sources obtained.

But perhaps the most underlying assumption presented in this thesis is the fact that reporters can never return to the nostalgic war reporting that dominated the Vietnam War, and every war prior to it. Because of technological advancements, even soldiers are detached from the front lines. Military technological advances allow for combat to take place without soldiers being engulfed in the war, like they once were. Airstrikes prevail over ground wars. Thus, the emotional aspect of reporting Vietnam may forever be lost.

In the context of this thesis, the strife between the military and the media appears to be an obstacle in upholding the democratic principles that both entities are charged

with maintaining. The military wants to uphold the utmost secrecy in war while the press wants openness in reporting on the conflict. This strife caused an obstructed view of conflict by the American people by the implementation of press exclusion and the national press pool system. It instigated a competitive nature between the press and the military, resulting in questions of credibility and biased reporting. Such competitiveness resulted in the nine statements of principles that continue to govern press coverage of war today.

And although the complaint discourse of the media continues to prevail, the public does not want to fight for the nostalgic war coverage that dominated the Vietnam era. The implications of contention between the military and the media illustrate a lack of candor between the press and the public that it serves. This created a negative perception of the press because of its intrusiveness, negativity, and bias that ultimately caused the public to side with military officials in implementing press restrictions on the battlefield in Grenada and in subsequent wars. A mid-November 2001 poll by the Gallup Organization found a dismal 43% approval rating for the media's coverage of the war in Afghanistan, while the same poll showed an 80% approval rating for Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's handling of the war (Hickey, 2002). In a Pew Research Center poll, half of the respondents say the military should exert more control over news from the Afghan front and 53% favor censorship of war news when national interest is involved (Hickey, 2002). As evidenced by these surveys, in addition to the one conducted for this study, the public still stands behind the military's restrictions on the media.

As evidenced by this thesis, the military is attempting to find middle ground between extreme press restrictions and complete press freedom on the battlefield. This is

an enormous step for the military. Threats to national security and the safety of journalists and troops alike still plague the authority for absolute coverage. But, for the most part, middle ground is not acceptable for the press. Examples from this thesis draw from the media's lack of interest in finding this middle ground that the military proposes. Therefore, perhaps the relationship can never be mended. Without cooperation by both entities, compromises can never be met.

The military's answer to concerns over press restrictions was the establishment of the national press pool system. However, correspondents now go beyond military restrictions, reporting in a unilateral style, attempting to grasp the nostalgic way of reporting war. This type of reporting was highly used during the Gulf War, when reporters known as "unilaterals" went out on their own to cover the conflict. Reports were filed using cellular phones, often before pool reporters could obtain the same information. In the midst of the war in Afghanistan, the press pool system was deployed once again. But within a few weeks, unilateral reporting was being implemented by news organizations. Reporters were able to break away from military restrictions, filing reports using the technology of video phones. Danger was imminent, but reporters still set out to get the stories on their own. Victoria Clarke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, told attendants at a Brookings/Harvard Forum:

...nothing stopped reporters from going into Afghanistan. As a matter of fact the most intrepid and the most entrepreneurial and the ones who were most committed to getting the story did exactly that. For quite some time, there were more media on the ground in Afghanistan than there were U.S. forces.

Dan Rather himself and his people for about two weeks straight were calling day in, day out, calling me, calling several other people saying we want to go here, we want to go there, and we gave the same answer we were giving everyone else which is, "We only have a handful of people on the ground, it's not appropriate at

this time, we're not going to do it." God bless Dan Rather, he gave up on us and got himself into Kabul and they rented a little space right there in town and he started reporting from Kabul. (Harvard/Brookings Forum, 2002)

And so, perhaps the media pool is no longer essential. Since enough reporters are willing to go beyond military restrictions to get the story on their own, the press pool proves to be unnecessary. As of May 2002, eight journalists were killed reporting the events in Afghanistan; each knew the dangers of reporting war, but all were willing to risk their lives to present first-hand coverage that was otherwise not provided by the military.

Although both are important in the upheaval of democracy, the press and the military perform two different functions. The military focuses on discipline, conformity, and authority; whereas, the press is characterized as individualistic, liberal, competitive, and independent. Accordingly, inherent strife is inevitable. If one was to pinpoint why the two entities are at odds with one another, perhaps it's because each of their roles in democracy often counterbalance that of the other during times of war. The press has the fundamental right to inform the public about what the government is doing, while the military upholds its duty of defending American interests at home and abroad. It times of war, when secrecy and security is of the utmost importance to the military, exposing these secrets and operational procedures is the constitutional right of the media. So, it is inevitable that a working relationship between the two entities during wartime is inaccessible.

Above all else, the military's attempt at a compromise in the relationship still calls for the suppression of the first amendment. This thesis gives many examples and implications of such suppression, and the complaint discourse that followed. However, as much as the press complains about and attempts to fight restrictions placed on them, they

continue to conform. Ideally, it is in the best interest of the press, and the public as well, to go beyond government restrictions – to find a way to get the story like reporters prior to Vietnam once did. But technologically speaking, this is truly unfeasible. America will never experience another Vietnam. The nation will never be involved in guerilla warfare like it did during the Vietnam era. Technology is too advanced. The type of warfare needed in Vietnam has succumbed to advanced military technological warfare – combat in the air before combat on the ground.

Journalists should give up the complaint discourse and accept the ways wars will be fought. They should envelop technology and use it for their own good. Because as technology continues to develop, it will become increasingly difficult for the Pentagon to limit media access.

General Dugan said in 1991:

...there are no simple answers for improving relations. Nevertheless, it would be advantageous for both institutions to find a continuing independent forum for discussion and for researching ways to better serve the public interest. Both the military and the media view themselves as professions. It would be a useful start if each viewed the other in the same light – and acted accordingly. (as cited in Sharkey, 1991, p. 170)

To begin the process, the military and the media must evaluate the relationship internally. They must ask themselves how to better the relationship within their separate organizations. Perhaps journalism schools should be charged with teaching young journalists how to adequately report on military affairs. Military leaders, in turn, should truly evaluate the First Amendment of the Constitution and completely understand the freedom of the press clause. This freedom cannot, and must not, be changed in relation to wartime. Whether in war or peace, the First Amendment must be upheld.

In the future, scholars must continue to look at evolving technology and its impact on military relations. In a matter of five years, the Internet has grown into one of the most popular entities in our culture. It has become synonymous with the way our lives have become—fast-paced and high-tech. Every aspect of life, whether it is buying a car, getting advice about our health, or reading a daily newspaper, has streamed its way onto the Internet. As a new form of technology used by the media, the Internet has the capabilities of breaking through government restrictions in the war zone, streaming news from the front to home computers instantaneously. Therefore, as this new medium becomes more than a supplement to other media outlets, scholars should see what role the Internet plays in future wars.

The future of the media-military relationship is unknown. However, the media will continue to be an active participant in conflict. In the progression of developments from Grenada to Afghanistan, it is apparent that there is a functional need to evaluate whether the media and the military are working together in the best interest of democracy. More importantly, a reassessment of whether the two entities are functioning together in the best interest of the public they are charged with serving should be conducted. The lingering images of Vietnam, followed by skepticism shared by both the media and the military towards each other, will continue to plague the relationship. It is a detrimental relationship that has evolved over centuries of American history. But both institutions must comprehend the other's duty and see that they have the same commitment to the public they both serve: the duty to uphold democracy and protect the

interests of the public. In order to serve the public better, the relationship must take a turn for the better – in the interest of democracy.

After the American Civil War, Brevet Major General Emory Upton wrote:

The people who, under the war powers of the Constitution, surrender their liberties and give up their lives and property have a right to know why our wars are unnecessarily prolonged. They have a right to know whether disasters have been brought about through the neglect and ignorance of Congress, which is intrusted with the power to raise and support armies, or through military incompetency. (as cited in Halloran, 1987, p. 10)

And perhaps it is this statement that should be the sentiment of both the military and the media. Suppression of information – in essence, suppression of the press – becomes almost hypocritical for the military. For a democracy to succeed, unfiltered government information must reach the public. So in upholding the democratic idea, the military must be open to complete press access to the battlefield. In this way, the media and the military can move towards a more democratic coexistence.

APPENDIX A
STORIES CODED DURING THE SAMPLED PERIODS

January 31 – February 10, 1968

January 31, 1968	<i>U.S. Aide in Embassy Villa Kills Guerilla With Pistol</i>
January 31, 1968	<i>Ambassador Safe</i>
January 31, 1968	<i>Johnson Receives Flow of Reports</i>
February 1, 1968	<i>Village Endures Night of Terror</i>
February 1, 1968	<i>Hue is Embattled: Other Cities Besieged</i>
February 1, 1968	<i>Embassy Attack: A Fight to Death</i>
February 1, 1968	<i>Enemy 'Revolutionary Council' Is Reported Formed in Saigon</i>
February 2, 1968	<i>Vietcongs' Attack Shocks Washington</i>
February 2, 1968	<i>Hanoi Says Aim of Raids Is to Oust Saigon Regime</i>
February 2, 1968	<i>Enemy Toll Soars: Offensive is Running 'Out of Steam'</i>
February 2, 1968	<i>Offensive is Said to Pinpoint Enemy's Stengths</i>
February 2, 1968	<i>Foe Is Said to Execute 2 G.I.'s Before Crowd</i>
February 3, 1968	<i>Enemy Holds Out</i>
February 3, 1968	<i>Enemy Maintains Tight Grip on Hue</i>
February 3, 1968	<i>Warning is Given</i>
February 4, 1968	<i>Washington Stunned By One-Two Blow</i>
February 4, 1968	<i>Vietcong Holding Position on Edge of Saigon Airport</i>
February 4, 1968	<i>War Crisscrosses Suburb of Saigon</i>
February 4, 1968	<i>By Bus, by Truck, on Foot, Foe Built Forces in Saigon</i>
February 5, 1968	<i>The Vietcong Launch Their 'Revolution'</i>
February 5, 1968	<i>2 Vietnamese at Embassy Said to Have Aided Attack</i>
February 6, 1968	<i>Streets of Saigon Shelled in Drive to Rout Vietcong</i>

February 7, 1968 *Foe Using Tanks First Time, Mauls Outpost Near DMZ*

February 7, 1968 *Tension in Capital is High*

February 8, 1968 *Saigon Fighting Slows*

February 8, 1968 *Foe in Saigon Says He Will 'Reconquer' Capital and Nation*

February 9, 1968 *War-Ending Victory Seen As Aim of Enemy's Drive*

February 10, 1968 *G.I.'s Enter Saigon to Help Eliminate Enemy Holdouts*

October 8 – October 18, 2001

October 8, 2001 *Bomb and Missile Attacks – Bin Laden Issues Threat*

October 8, 2001 *Blair Declares the Airstrikes Are an Act of Self-Defense*

October 8, 2001 *In His Own Words: Tony Blair*

October 8, 2001 *Thunderous Blasts And Bright Flashes Mark Kabul Strikes*

October 8, 2001 *Tension and Secrecy on Warships As the Jets and Missiles Roar Off*

October 8, 2001 *Routine Start In Novel War*

October 8, 2001 *2nd Wave of Troops Arrives in Uzbekistan*

October 8, 2001 *A Mission Begun, a Defiant Bin Laden and Another Crisp, Clear Day*

October 8, 2001 *Deploying Stealthy B-2's, Military Promises Day-and-Night Bombing Campaign*

October 8, 2001 *The American Offensive Begins*

October 9, 2001 *Scaled-Down Raid*

October 9, 2001 *Dusty City May Be Pivotal to U.S. Effort*

October 9, 2001 *A Wary Warship Launches New Salvos*

October 9, 2001 *Taliban Foes, With Supply Problems, Sharply Reduce Attacks*

October 9, 2001 *Rumsfeld Sees Long Battle; Says Bombs Aren't Enough*

October 10, 2001 *Commando Strikes*

October 10, 2001 *Pentagon Says Bombs Destroy Terror Camps*

October 10, 2001 *U.S. Raids Kill 4 U.N. Aides Outside Kabul*

October 10, 2001 *U.S. Planes From the Enterprise Are Using Their Bombs and Missiles Sparingly*

October 10, 2001 *The Signs Of a Buildup Are Becoming More Evident*

October 10, 2001 *A Riskier Phase, A Widening Focus and Stress and Strain All Around*

October 11, 2001 *Strikes are Heavy*

October 11, 2001 *Attacks on Taliban Troops, Blackouts in Kabul and the Money Trail*

October 11, 2001 *Afghanistan's Distance From Carriers Limits U.S. Pilots' Flights*

October 11, 2001 *Murky Picture Emerges of Life Under Bombardment*

October 11, 2001 *Days Are Normal in Kabul, But Nights Are Terrifying*

October 11, 2001 *Wartime Secrecy*

October 12, 2001 *Long War is Seen*

October 12, 2001 *Enemy's Planes 'in Pieces' Air Wing Commander Says*

October 13, 2001 *Uzbekistan to Let U.S. Use Bases In Return for Promise of Security*

October 13, 2001 *U.S. Raid Kills Unknown Number in an Afghan Village*

October 14, 2001 *Bombing and Diplomacy Overseas, Some More Warnings at Home*

October 14, 2001 *Pentagon Says an Error Led to Bombing of Houses That Killed Four in Kabul*

October 14, 2001 *Strains of Hope in City Under Bombing*

October 15, 2001 *President Rejects Offer By Taliban for Negotiations*

October 15, 2001 *For the Moment, All Quiet On the Northern Front*

October 15, 2001 *In Village Reportedly Struck by U.S. Air Attack, Destruction, Death and Anger*

October 16, 2001 *Taliban Leader a Target of U.S. Air Campaign*

October 16, 2001 *Special Operations Gunship Being Used Against Taliban*

October 17, 2001 *Pressuring the Enemy*

October 17, 2001 *Pilots Told to Fire at Will in Some Zones*

October 18, 2001 *Bush Says Aim Is to Ease Entry Of Land Force*

October 18, 2001 *U.S. Tactics Thwart Afghan Rebels*

October 18, 2001 *Taliban Chief Urges Troops: Defy 'Infidel'*

REFERENCES

- Allen, M. & de Moraes, L. (2001, October 11). TV Networks to Limit Use of Tapes From Bin Laden: White House to Reinstate Some Congressional Briefings. *Washington Post*, p. A08.
- Arlen, M. (1982, August 16). The Falklands, Vietnam, and Our Collective Memory. *The New Yorker*, 70-75.
- Baroody, J. (1998). *Media Access and the Military: The Case of the Gulf War*. New York: University Press of America, Inc.
- Bigart, H. (1962, June 3). Saigon's regime rejects pressures for reforms. *New York Times*, p. 1A.
- Bindas, K. (1990). The Strains of Commitment: American Periodical Press and South Vietnam. *Journalism History*, 17(3/4), 63-69.
- Boot, W. (1990). Wading Around in the Panama Pool. *Columbia Journalism Review*, March/April 1990, 18-20.
- Boyd, J. (Ed.). (1950). *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Braestrup, P. (1978). *Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington*. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.
- Braestrup, P. (1985). *Battle Lines: Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Military and the Media*. New York: Priority Press Publications.
- Bremmer, L. (1991). Terrorism, the Media, and the Government. In L. Matthews (Ed.), *Newsmen & National Defense* (pp. 73-80). New York: Brassey's (US), Inc.
- Brookings/Harvard Forum. (2002, January 9). *Press Coverage and the War on Terrorism: Assessing the Media and the Government* [On-line]. Available: <http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/comm./transcript/20020109.htm>
- Buckley, T. (31 January, 1968). Ambassador safe: guerillas also strike presidential palace and many bases. *The New York Times*, p. 1A.
- Bush: State of Kuwait must be restored or no nation will be safe. (1990, November

9). *The Washington Post*, p. A33.

Castro, J. (1983, November 7). Keeping the press from action – for the first time, a major U.S. military operation is blacked out. *Time*, p. 65.

Chomsky, N. (2001). *9-11*. New York: Seven Stories Press.

Clifford, C. and Holbrooke, R. (1991, May 6). Annals of Government (The Vietnam Years – Part I). *The New Yorker*, 44-80.

Clifford, C. and Holbrooke, R. (1991, May 13). Annals of Government (The Vietnam Years – Part II). *The New Yorker*, 45-83.

Combelle-Siegel, P. (1996). *The Troubled Path to the Pentagon's Rules on Media Access to the Battlefield: Grenada to Today* (Strategic Studies Institute Monograph). Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College.

Copeland, P. (1990, January 2). Army women went into Panama with weapons – and used them. *Washington Times*, p. A1.

Cousins, N. (1990, October 16). What's the truth on Panama casualties? *The Christian Science Monitor*, p. 18.

Cronkite, W. (1991, March 19). *The War and the Media: A Retrospective*. Speech given at a forum presented by the National Press Club, Washington, D.C.

Diederich, B. (1984, July). War News: under new management. *Worldview*, p. 7.

Downey, L. & Kaiser, R. (2002). *The News About the News*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Eke, K. (1991). Introduction: Critical Issues in Media Coverage of Terrorism. In A. Alali & K. Eke (Eds.), *Media Coverage of Terrorism*. (pp. 3-11). Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

Fall, B. (1958, May 31). Will South Vietnam Be Next?. *The Nation*, 491.

Fallows, J. (1996). *Breaking the News: How the Media Undermine American Democracy*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Farhi, P. (2001, October 12). The Networks, Giving Aide to the Enemy?: Unedited Bin Laden Video Sparks Debate. *The Washington Post*, p. C01.

Fialka, J. (1992). *Hotel Warriors: Covering the Gulf War*. Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Press Center.

Gannett Foundation Report. (1991). *The Media at War: The Press and the Persian Gulf Conflict*. New York: Gannett Foundation Media Center.

Gantz, W. (1993). Introduction. In W. Gantz & B. Greenberg (Eds.), *Desert Storm and the Mass Media*. (pp. 1-15). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Gitlin, T. (2001). *Media Unlimited: How the Torrent of Images and Sounds Overwhelms Our Lives*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

Goodnow, C. (1968). *News Coverage of the Tet Offensive*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College.

Grenada – and Mount Suribachi. (1983, October 28). *The New York Times*, p. A26.

Griffith, T. (1985, March 11). Credibility at Stake. *Time*, 125, 57.

Hallin, D. (1986). *The “Uncensored War”: The Media and Vietnam*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Halloran, R. (1987). Soldiers and scribblers: A common mission. *Parameters – U.S. Army War College Quarterly, Spring 1987*, 10-28.

Hammond, W. (1988). Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968. Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, United States Army.

Hammond, W. (1998). *Reporting Vietnam*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.

Hammond, W. (1994). The News Media and the Military. In J. Jessup & L. Ketz (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of the American Military* (pp. 2085-2114). New York: Scribner.

Hanson, C. (1992). The Pool. In H. Smith (Ed.) *The Media and the Gulf War* (pp. 128-135). Washington, D.C.: Seven Locks Press.

Henry, W. (1983, December 12). Journalism under fire: A growing perception of arrogance threatens the American press. *Time*, p. 76.

Hickey, N. (2002). Access Denied: The Pentagon’s War Reporting Rules are the Toughest Ever. *Columbia Journalism Review* [On-line]. Available: <http://www.cjr.org/year/02/1/hickey.asp>

Hill, R. (1997, March). *The Future Military-Media Relationship: The Media as an Actor in War Execution*. Paper presented to the Research Department, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.

Hockstader, L. (1990, October 6). In Panama, civilian deaths still remain an issue. *The Washington Post*, p. A23.

Hoffman, F. (1990). *Review of Panama Pool Deployment – December 1989*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense.

Hoffman, F. (1991). The Panama Press Pool Deployment: A Critique. In L. Matthews (ed.), *Newsmen & National Defense: Is Conflict Inevitable* (pp. 91-109). New York: Brassey's (US), Inc.

Holsti, O. (1969). *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities*. Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company

Hook, S. (1986). Public Perception & Expectations of the News Media. *World Wide Media Relations* [On-line]. Available: <http://www.west.net/~wwmr/mediapap.htm>

Howell, C. (1987). War, Television and Public Opinion. *Military Review*, February 1987, 71-79.

Hunter, M. (1983, October 31). U.S. eases restrictions on coverage. *The New York Times*, p. A12.

James, D. (1991). *Walter Cronkite: His Life and Times*. Brentwood, TN: J M Press.

Jehl, D. (2001, October 8). Tension and Secrecy on Warships As the Jets and Missiles Roar Off. *The New York Times*, p. A1.

Jones, A. (1990, August 10). News organizations angry at lack of a press pool. *The New York Times*, p. A10.

Journalism Leaders Challenge Info Clamp-down. (2001, November 30). *Poynter Institute* [On-line]. Available: <http://www.poynter.org/terrorism/statement.htm>

Kalb, M. (1994). A View from the Press. In Lance Bennett & David Paletz (eds.), *Taken by Storm*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Kennedy, W. (1993). *The Military and the Media: Why the Press Cannot be Trusted to Cover a War*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Kirby, K. (2001). Freedom of Information: How Much Access Should the Media Have? *Communicator* [On-line]. Available: <http://www.rtnda.org/foi/howmuch.shtml>

Knightley, P. (1975). *The First Casualty: From Crimea to Vietnam – The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Myth Maker*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Knightley, P. (2001). In Wartime, Government Considers Media a Menace. *The Public I: An Investigative Report of the Center for Public Integrity* [On-line]. Available: http://www.public-i.org/commentary_01_103101.htm

Krippendorff, K. (1980). *Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publishing.

Kurtz, H. U.S. military clamps down on media's access: Many journalists worry they will have less information about troops than ever before. *The Miami Herald* [On-line]. Available: <http://www.miami.com/herald/special/news/specialreport/2001/docs/071953.htm>

Lande, N. (1998). *Dispatches from the Front: A History of the American War Correspondent*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Laurence, R. (1991, March 1). So you got mad at the tube. *San Diego Union*, p. A12.

Maraniss, D. (1983, November 15). Information blackout revives old issues. *The Washington Post*, p. A2.

Mandelbaum, M. (1982). Vietnam: The Television War. *Daedalus*, Fall 1982, 157-169.

McLuhan, M. (1963). *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man*. New York: Penguin Books.

McIntyre, J. (2001). New war to be fought with unprecedented secrecy. *CNN.com* [On-line]. Available: <http://www.cnn.com/2001/09/17/ret.us.secret.war>

Meddis, S. (1990, January 26). Noreiga cache story may be so much corn. *USA Today*, p. A4.

Mohr, C. (1968, January 31, 1968). U.S. aide in embassy villa kills guerilla with pistol. *The New York Times*, p. 1A.

Mohr, C. (1983). Once Again – Did the Press Lose Vietnam?. *Columbia Journalism Review*, November/December 1983, 51-56.

Naparstek, A. (1993). *Partners in Conflict: The Media and the Military in Grenada, Panama and the Gulf Wars*. Unpublished thesis, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri.

National Coalition Against Censorship (NCAC). *News and Commentary* [On-line]. Available: <http://www.ncac.org/issues/freex911.html>

Neal, D. (2001, October 20). Terrorism: the only winner when government tries to control news coverage. *The News Leader* [On-line]. Available: <http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documented=15201>

Nisbet, M. (2001). Media Coverage After the Attack: Reason and Deliberative Democracy Put to the Test. *Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal* [On-line]. Available: <http://www.csicop.org/genx/terrorattack>

Nixon, R. (1978). *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*. New York: Grosset & Dunlap.

Oreskes, M. (1990, Aug. 12). Poll on troop movement shows support (and anxiety). *New York Times*, p. 13.

Pincus, R. (1997). Press Access to Military Operations: Grenada and the Need for a New Analytical Framework. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, 135(3), 813-850.

Plato (1966). *Plato's Republic*. (I.A. Richards, Trans.). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Postman, N. (1985). *Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business*. New York: Viking Penguin Inc.

Price, B. (1942, December 15). Censorship: An Evil of War. *Vital Speeches of the Day*, 9, 158-160.

Richmond, R. (1989, Dec. 21). CNN brings Panamanians live action. *The Orange County Register*, p. A12.

Rochelle, C. (1991, March 19). *The War and the Media: A Retrospective*. Speech given at a forum presented by the National Press Club, Washington, D.C.

Rohter, L. (1990, April 1). Panama and U.S. strive to settle on death toll. *The New York Times*, p. 12A.

Shales, T. (1983, October 28). Grenada: A question of news control; limited to military footage, networks cry foul. *Washington Post*, p. B1.

Shanker, T. (2001, October 9). Rumsfeld Sees Long Battle; Says Bombs Aren't Enough. *The New York Times*, p. A10.

Sharkey, J. (1991). *Under Fire: U.S. Military Restrictions on the Media from Grenada to the Persian Gulf*. Washington, D.C.: The Center for Public Integrity.

Sharkey, J. (2001). War, Censorship and the First Amendment. *Media Studies Journal*, 15(1), 20-24.

Shaw, D. (2001, October 19). Rumsfeld OKs Principles for Media Access to Troops. *Los Angeles Times* [On-line]. Available: <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-101901media-story.story>

Shields, T. (2001). Administration Pressed On Rules Of Engagement: Press Finds Information Lacking On Terrorism War. *Editor & Publisher.com* [On-line]. Available: http://www.editorandpublisher.com/editorandpublisher/headlines/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1079047

Shoemaker, P. & Reese, S. (1991). *Mediating the Message: Theories of Influence on Mass Media Content*. New York: Longman Publishing Group.

Sidle, W. (1984). *Report by the CJCS Media-Military Relations Panel (Sidle Panel)*. Washington, D.C.: Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

Spencer, J. (2001, October 11). Decoding bin Laden. *Newsweek.com* [On-line]. Available: <http://www.msnbc.com/news/641689.asp>

Steinbeck, J. (1958). *Once There Was a War*. New York: Viking Press.

Stempel, G. (1989). Content Analysis. In Guido H. Stempel III & Bruce H. Westley (eds.), *Research Methods in Mass Communications* (pp.124-136). Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Summers, H. (1984). *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*. New York: Dell.

Summers, H. (1986). Western Media and Recent Wars. *Military Review*, May 1986, 4-17.

Sunstein, C. (1993). *Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech*. New York: The Free Press.

Swanson, D. (2001, September 30). Dissent – it's not too popular in these times. *The Dallas Morning News*, p. 28A.

Teeter, D., LeDuc, D., and Loving, B. (1998). *Law of Mass Communications: Freedom and Control of Print and Broadcast Media* (9th ed.). New York: Foundation Press.

Terrorism and the First Amendment. (2001, December 6). *The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press* [On-line]. Available:
<http://www.rcfp.org/news/2001/1206terror.html>

Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press. (1991, January 31). *The People, the Press and the War in the Gulf – A Special Times Mirror News Interest Index*. New York.

Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press. (1991, March 25). *The People, the Press and the War in the Gulf – A Special Times Mirror News Interest Index, Part II*. New York.

United States Southern Command. (1990, December 14). Operation Just Cause: One Year Later (Panamanian Fatalities and Common Graves). *Fact Sheet*. Washington, D.C.: United States Southern Command.

Villard, H. (1861, July 27). Army Correspondence: It's Quality. *The Nation*.

Warren, J. (1989, Dec. 21). Instant reporters born for TV. *Chicago Tribune*, p. A16.

Warren, R. P. (1961, March 17). Looking Back. *Life*, 82-88.

Weber, R. (1990). *Basic Content Analysis*. Newberry Park, CA: Sage Publishing, Inc.

Williams, P. (1991, March 14). Speech given at a forum presented by the National Press Club, Washington, D.C.

Wines, M. (1990, August 9). Press left out of Gulf airlift. *New York Times*, p. A14.

Wyatt, C. (1986). At the Cannon's Mouth: The American Press and the Vietnam War. *Journalism History*, 13:4, 104-111.

Young, P., & Jesser, P. (1997). *The Media and the Military*. New York: St. Martin's Press.